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Differential Preemption
DR. RONEN PERRY*
Preemption is a constitutional law doctrine whereby state and local authorities
are deprived of their powers in particular areas governed by federal law. In
setting the boundaries of state sovereignty within a federal polity, it constitutes
one of the pillars of the federal political structure. Viewed differently,
preemption is one of the strongest legal unification methods. This Article
focuses on a highly important and distinctive niche in preemption debate,
namely the interrelation between federal maritime law and state law. It offers
an original theoretical framework for maritime preemption analysis, which
supports a judicial heuristic standing in stark contrast to that advocated by
prominent scholars as the late Professor David Currie. Although maritime
preemption remains the source of inspiration and the focal point of this Article,
the implications of the main idea are far-reaching. It may be pertinent to
allocation of lawmaking powers in other areas and to other types of unification
and harmonization methods, and may be applicable in other federal and
federal-like systems, such as the European Union.
This Article contends that the preemptive force offederal maritime law should
relate to prospective litigants' ability to pre-select the law applicable to their
interaction. Maritime preemption is generally based on the need for
uniformity. However, and this is crucial, uniformity is not an end in itself but a
means for the protection and advancement of more fundamental federal
interests. As the underlying justifications for uniformity weaken, so does the
need for preemption. This Article ascertains that if the parties in a particular
type of case can easily select applicable law before the occurrence of the
legally relevant incident, uniformity becomes unnecessary. Moreover, where
pre-selection based on individual preferences is possible, uniformity may be
detrimental to the common good, because it curtails regulatory competition.
Under these circumstances, uniformity-driven preemption of state law should
be avoided. If on the other hand, pre-selection is impossible or impractical,
the need for uniformity resurfaces, and preemption might be warranted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Preemption is a constitutional law doctrine whereby state and local
authorities are deprived of their powers in particular areas governed by federal
law. 1 In setting the boundaries of state sovereignty within a federal polity, it
constitutes one of the pillars of the federal political structure. Viewed
differently, preemption is one of the strongest legal unification methods.2
1 See JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 1 (2006).
2 See infra Part III.A. 1.
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Recent cases like Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.3 and Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth LLC 4 highlight the growing salience of preemption in contemporary
legal discourse. This Article focuses on a highly important and distinctive niche
in preemption debate, namely the interrelation between federal maritime law
and state law. It offers an original theoretical framework for maritime
preemption analysis, which supports a judicial heuristic standing in stark
contrast to that advocated by prominent scholars such as the late Professor
David Currie. Although maritime preemption remains the source of inspiration
and the focal point of this Article, the implications of the main idea are far-
reaching. It may be relevant to the allocation of lawmaking powers in other
areas and to other types of unification and harmonization methods, and may be
applicable in other federal and federal-like systems, such as the European
Union.
The relative importance of maritime preemption derives mainly from the
contribution of maritime activities to the American economy. The United States
is a maritime nation, with only two international land borders, and thousands of
miles of coastline along two oceans. 5 Shipping and other naval ventures have
always played a central role in maintaining and enhancing both national security
and economic well-being, 6 although they may have lost some of their gleam
with the development of competing means of transportation. 7 In 2008, maritime
transportation accounted for 78% of U.S. international trade by volume and
approximately 48% by value ($1.62 out of $3.4 trillion).8 According to the final
report of the United States Commission on Ocean Policy, more than thirteen
3 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134, 1139-40 (2011) (holding that a state tort claim was not
preempted by a federal motor vehicle safety regulation).
4 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011) (holding that the federal Vaccine Injury Act preempts
state law design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers).
5 See Scott C. Truver, The Law of the Sea and the Military Use of the Oceans in 2010,
45 LA. L. REV. 1221, 1227 (1985).6 See Lynn N. Hughes, An Introduction: Principles and Pragmatism, 21 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 1, 1 (1996).
7 Id.
8 See IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AN EVALUATION OF MARITIME POLICY IN MEETING THE
COMMERCIAL AND SECURITY NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 8-9 (2009), available at
http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/gcpath/MARADPolicyStudy.pdf (reporting both that 48%
of U.S. international trade by value and 78% by volume was maritime trade); U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., U.S. WATER TRANSPORTATION STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT 9 (2011),
available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/USWaterTransportationStatistical_
snapshot.pdf (reporting that 48% of U.S. international trade by value was maritime trade). In
2001, maritime transportation accounted for 78% of U.S. international trade by volume and
for more than 38% by value. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 17 (2004), available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/
fullcolor rpt/000_oceanfullreport.pdf. In 1994, maritime transportation accounted for
98% of U.S. international trade by tonnage, and almost half by value. B.J. Haeck, Note,
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun: An Examination of Jurisdiction, Choice-of-Laws, and
Federal Interests in Maritime Law, 72 WASH. L. REV. 181, 181 (1997).
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million jobs were connected to maritime trade in 2001. 9 Additionally, annual
production of oil and gas was valued at $25-40 billion, and the annual value of
fishing activities exceeded $28 billion. ' 0
The uniqueness of maritime preemption derives from the special nature of
general maritime law. A preemption dispute generally hinges on judicial
construction of federal legislation. Some federal statutes explicitly preempt state
and local powers, and others have been interpreted as implicitly doing so.tl
Following Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 12 general maritime law has remained the
only manifestation of traditional federal common law. 13 Maritime law is
consequently the only area in which state law may be preempted by federal
purely judge-made law, rather than federal legislation or constitutional
provisions. 14 Put differently, preemption in maritime law may be mandated by a
non-representative, politically unaccountable body.15
This Article contends that the preemptive force of federal maritime law
should relate to prospective litigants' ability to preselect the law applicable to
their interaction. Maritime preemption is generally based on the need for
uniformity. However, and this is crucial, uniformity is not an end in itself, but a
means for the protection and advancement of more fundamental federal
interests. As the underlying justifications for uniformity weaken, so does the
need for preemption. This Article ascertains that if the parties in a particular
type of case can easily select applicable law before the occurrence of the legally
relevant incident, uniformity becomes unnecessary. Moreover, where pre-
selection based on individual preferences is possible, uniformity may be
detrimental to the common good because it curtails regulatory competition.
Under these circumstances, uniformity-driven preemption of state law should be
avoided. If, on the other hand, pre-selection is impossible or impractical, the
need for uniformity resurfaces, and preemption might be warranted.
Part II outlines the current legal framework. Preemption analysis is required
only where the states and the federal government have concurrent powers.
Where federal powers are exclusive, no preemption dispute can arise because
there is no state power to be preempted. 16 Section A presents the competing
federal and state powers in the field of maritime law. Section B discusses the
9 See U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, supra note 8, at 2.
'Old.
11 See infra Part II.B. 1.
12 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general common law.").
13See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 273, 274, 284
(1999) [hereinafter Young, Preemption at Sea]. Interpretation and implementation of
specific federal legislation is surely an exercise of judicial-lawmaking power, but is clearly
different from purely judge-made law. Id. at 285. For further discussion of the various forms
of federal common law, see Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1639, 1642-43 (2008) [hereinafter Young, Federal Common Law].
14 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 274.
15 See id. at 276, 328-29; see also infra Part II.B.2.a.
16See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 770
(1994).
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principles whereby courts have endeavored to delineate the boundaries between
federal and state powers. It first presents the main principles governing
preemption controversies, where state law has to confront the underlying
policies of specific federal legislation, and then analyzes the special principles
developed in maritime jurisprudence, where the federal policy embodied in a
particular rule is accompanied by the overarching need for subject-matter
uniformity, and federal courts have an undisputed lawmaking power. In
particular, it examines the well-known Jensen formula, 17 and a few notable
distinctions that have been used in maritime preemption analysis. The
interrelation between federal and state law is exemplified through a brief
appraisal of the law governing liability for economic losses arising from marine
oil pollution.
Part III puts forward and defends the new guidepost. Section A provides the
building blocks. It explains that the purpose of the Admiralty Clause of the
Constitution was to maintain uniformity of maritime law within the United
States. This goal has been pursued by recognizing federal lawmaking powers,
and cautiously preempting state law. This Article then substantiates the idea that
uniformity is not the ultimate end, but a means for advancing more fundamental
federal policies. Section B maintains that an inverse relationship should exist
between the preemptive force of federal maritime law in a particular type of
case and litigants' capacity to preselect applicable law. This Article shows that
this argument is theoretically sound and doctrinally tenable. On the theoretical
level, it argues that if the parties can preselect applicable law, the federal
objectives usually associated with uniformity can be achieved without
uniformity, hence without preemption of state law. Private choice of law also
has the advantage of facilitating beneficial regulatory competition. On the
doctrinal level, the article demonstrates that pre-selection is legally possible,
and that the proposed guidepost can be utilized within the existing constitutional
framework. Section B then shows that the main thesis can support a judicial
heuristic, and explains its qualifications. Generally, in a paradigmatic
contractual setting the parties can incorporate a choice-of-law provision into
their contract, so no need exists for compelled uniformity. In a paradigmatic tort
case, on the other hand, the parties may have been complete strangers prior to
the accident, so private choice of law is less likely, and the need for uniformity
may arise. Section C demonstrates how the new guidepost can be implemented
in real-life situations taken from notable Supreme Court decisions.
17 See infra Part II.A.2.b.
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1I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Competing Powers
1. Jurisdiction
a. Federal
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, known as the Admiralty Clause,
provides that "[t]he judicial power [of the United States] shall extend.., to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."'18 This grant applies to civil
maritime cases, whereas criminal admiralty jurisdiction derives from a different
constitutional and statutory framework. 19 Thus, the Judiciary Act, originally
enacted in 1789, provides that the district courts "shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of... [a]ny civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."'20 Admiralty is the only
substantive area of law with regard to which the Constitution grants subject-
matter jurisdiction to the federal judiciary.21 Even so, Alexander Hamilton
noted that
[t]he most bigoted idolizers of State authority, have not thus far shown a
disposition to deny the National Judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes.
These so generally depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the
rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative
to the public peace. 22
Admiralty jurisdiction encompasses "all maritime contracts, torts, and
injuries." 23 Still, there is a clear distinction between contract and tort cases.
Regarding the former, the traditional English rule conceded jurisdiction, with a
few exceptions, only to contracts "made upon the sea and to be executed
18 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend ... to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction .. "). For a historical account of this provision, see
Harrington Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10
CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1925).
19See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power .... To define and
Punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.").
2028 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). For a discussion of the original version of this statute, see
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 2-5 (3d ed. 2001).
21 See Steven R. Swanson, Federalism, the Admiralty, and Oil Spills, 27 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 379, 381 (1996).2 2 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898); see
also Theodore F. Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law,
64 HARv. L. REv. 246, 248-49 (1950) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra, at 437).2 3 DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 398, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
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thereon." 24 However, since DeLovio v. Boit25 jurisdiction over contracts has
extended to all contracts "which relate to the navigation, business or commerce
of the sea." 26 Put differently, jurisdiction depends on the subject matter of the
contract-maritime or not,27 regardless of the place of formation and the place
of execution.28 This test was endorsed by the Supreme Court shortly
thereafter, 29 and has held sway since.30
Admiralty jurisdiction over torts was originally based on locality. 31 Under
the locality test a tort fell within maritime jurisdiction only if it occurred on the
high seas or other navigable waters,32 including inland rivers, streams, lakes,
and the like.33 To qualify as "navigable waters," a body of water must be used,
or have the potential of being used, for "customary modes of trade and travel,"
and must, by itself or by uniting with other waters, form a continuous artery for
interstate or international commerce. 34
Initially, the plaintiff had to show that the cause of action was "complete
within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends-on the high seas or
navigable waters." 35 Therefore, an action for negligence was not within
admiralty jurisdiction if the whole harm was sustained on land.36 Subsequent
decisions made clear that a tort satisfied the locality test if and only if the first
significant effect of the defendant's wrong on the plaintiff occurred on
navigable waters. 37 However, in 1948 Congress extended admiralty jurisdiction
to all cases of damage or injury caused by a vessel on navigable waters
"notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on
land."'38 While this provision clearly brings ship-to-shore collisions within
24fIns. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 26 (1871).
25 7 F. Cas. 398.
261d. at 444.
27 1d. at 440; Steven F. Friedell, Searching for a Compass: Federal and State Law
Making Authority in Admiralty, 57 LA. L. REv. 825, 827 (1997).28 DeLovio, 7 F. Cas. at 444; Friedell, supra note 27, at 827.
29 Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 459 (1847) (the subject matter in cases of
contract determines the jurisdiction); see also Ins. Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 26 ("[T]he true
criterion is the nature and subject[]matter of the contract, as whether it was a maritime
contract, having reference to maritime service or maritime transactions.").
30 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Cent. Gulf Lines, 500 U.S. 603, 610-11 (1991).
3 1 DeLovio, 7 F. Cas. at 444.
32 See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 34-35 (1865); DeLovio, 7 F. Cas. at 420,
444.
33 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 11; Friedell, supra note 27, at 846.
34 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
35 The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 36.
36 1d.
37 See David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The
Need for a National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 286 (1998).
3846 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006).
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admiralty jurisdiction,39 it does not require physical contact by the vessel.
Proximate causation between the vessel's activities and the injury suffices.40
In recent decades the Supreme Court has qualified the locality test. In
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland,41 an airplane crashed into Lake Erie
following a collision with a flock of seagulls. 42 The aircraft owner sued the
airport operator and airport personnel. 43 Although the incident occurred on or
over navigable waters, the Court held that a mechanical application of the
locality test might not be sensible and consonant with the purposes of maritime
law, and that at least in aviation tort cases, locality was "not a sufficient
predicate for admiralty jurisdiction." 44 The Court consequently devised an
additional precondition for maritime jurisdiction, allegedly more consistent with
the history and purpose of the admiralty grant: "[T]he wrong [complained of
must] bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. '45 Despite
the specific context of this decision, the maritime nexus requirement currently
applies to all tort cases, not only to aviation accidents. 46
In Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, the Court rejected the argument
that the wrongful conduct must have a substantial relationship to commercial
maritime activity.47 It explained that while the primary focus of admiralty
jurisdiction was the protection of maritime commerce, this federal interest
would not be adequately served if admiralty jurisdiction was restricted to
"individuals actually engaged in commercial maritime activity."48 This is
because noncommercial maritime activities may also affect maritime
commerce. 49 The Court concluded that a collision between two pleasure boats
on navigable waters had a significant relationship with maritime commerce due
to its potential disruptive impact on such commerce. 50 In an extremely
influential footnote the Court further explained that not every accident that
might be disruptive to maritime commerce falls within admiralty jurisdiction.
Rather, admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate if "potential hazard to maritime
commerce arises out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity."'51
39 See, e.g., United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 615-16 (9th Cir.
1953).40 See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding
shoreline damages caused by a marine oil spill within jurisdiction).
41409 U.S. 249 (1972).
4 2 Id. at 250.
43 1d. at 251 n.2.
44Id. at 261.4 5Id. at 268.
46 See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1982).
4 7 Id. at 674.
4 81d. at 674-75.
4 9 1d. at 675.
50 d
51 Foremost Ins., 457 U.S. at 675 n.5.
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In Sisson v. Ruby,52 the Court endorsed this footnote, formulating a two-
prong maritime nexus test 53 that has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases.54
First, the type of incident must have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime
commerce. 55 The judicial inquiry turns on the possible impact of a type of
incident, not on the actual effects of the particular incident 56: "[A] court must
assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether
such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity. ' 57 Moreover, the
relevant class of incidents must pose "more than a fanciful risk" to maritime
commerce. 58 Second, the general character of the activity giving rise to the
incident must bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. 59
According to Foremost, a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity need not necessarily involve a commercial activity. 60 Indeed, the Court
in Foremost concluded that operating a pleasure boat satisfies the "substantial
relationship" test.61 Additionally, under Sisson, a substantial relationship to
traditional maritime activity need not necessarily involve navigation and may
exist even with respect to "other activities traditionally undertaken by vessels,
commercial or noncommercial, 62 including docking.63
In conclusion, a party seeking to invoke admiralty jurisdiction over a tort
case must establish that (1) the tort occurred on navigable waters, or the injury
was "caused by a vessel on navigable waters"; (2) the type of incident,
generally defined, has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce;
and (3) the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. 64
b. State
The Judiciary Act, as amended, qualifies the grant of exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction to federal courts by "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled. '65 The "saving to suitors" clause is
generally interpreted as giving state courts concurrent jurisdiction in
52497 U.S. 358 (1990).
53Id. at 362-64.
54 See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,
534,538-39(1995).
55 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362-63; see also Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534, 538.
56 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363.
571d.
58 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539.
59 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364-65.60 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
61 Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982).
62 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 366-67.
63 1d. at 367.
64 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 533-34
(1995).
6528 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
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admiralty.66 So subject to a few exceptions enumerated below, this provision
enables plaintiffs in maritime cases to sue in state courts. 67
State courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction in two types of cases. First,
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over distinctive admiralty remedies
and procedures unknown to land-based common law, such as in rem
proceedings against vessels68 and possibly the more unusual actions relating to
salvage awards,69 general average contributions, 70  and prizes (that is,
confiscation of enemy vessels). 71 Second, specific maritime statutes extend
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.72 These include the Limitation of
Shipowner Liability Act,73 the Ship Mortgage Act,74 the Suits in Admiralty
Act,75 the Public Vessels Act,76 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.77
66 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 99; David P. Currie, Federalism and the
Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 158, 169; David W. Robertson,
The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases After Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21
TUL. MAR. L.J. 81, 84 (1996) [hereinafter Robertson, Applicability of State Law]; David W.
Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 325,
328, 332 (1995) [hereinafter Robertson, Displacement of State Law]; Stevens, supra note 22,
at 251-52 (discussing the views of Story and Dodd).6 7 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 283.
68 Many maritime rights can be enforced in rem against the vessel or in personam
against the owner, but a suit in rem may be brought only in an admiralty court. See Madruga
v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954); Currie, supra note 66, at 170; Friedell, supra
note 27, at 839; Gordon W. Paulsen, An Historical Overview of the Development of
Uniformity in International Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1081 (1983); Stevens,
supra note 22, at 263.
69 See Simmons v. The Steamship Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130, 137 (1909) ("The claim
which the libel asserted was for salvage compensation, and it therefore presented a character
of action cognizable exclusively by a court of admiralty of the United States."); Metro. Dade
Cnty. v. One Bronze Cannon, 537 F. Supp. 923, 928-29 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (explaining that a
salvage action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty court); O'Neill v.
Schoenbrod, 355 So. 2d 440, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (same); 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 123 (7th ed. 2010), available at Lexis (same).
7 0 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 99 n.4.
71See id. at8.
72 See Currie, supra note 66, at 170.
73 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006). Section 30511 provides that the owner of a vessel
may bring an action under this Act in a federal district court.
74 1d §§ 31301-31343. Under § 31325(c), the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over the enforcement of preferred mortgage liens in in rem actions.
75 Id. §§ 30901-30918. Section 30906(a) provides that a civil action under this Act
shall be brought in a federal district court. See also Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158,
159 (1966) ("The Suits in Admiralty Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts
when the suit is of a maritime nature.").
7646 U.S.C. §§ 31101-31113 (authorizing maritime claims against the United States).
Section 31104(a) provides that a civil action under this Act shall be brought in a federal
district court.
7728 id § 1330 (applying to maritime claims against foreign countries); see also
Collett v. Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 362 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234 (D.D.C.
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2. Lawmaking
a. A General Comment on Applicable Law
According to the traditional stance, the constitutional grant of admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal courts was also intended to determine applicable law:
The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and
statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was most
certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." 78
Thus, when a federal court acquires admiralty jurisdiction it must apply
substantive maritime law. 79 Generally, in the absence of a relevant federal
statute, general maritime law as developed by the federal judiciary should
apply. 80 Moreover, as admiralty jurisdiction was granted to facilitate subject-
matter uniformity, the same substantive law must be applied to maritime
disputes by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction.8' So the only
difference between admiralty and diversity courts in settling maritime cases is
procedural. 82
Finally, under the reverse-Erie doctrine state courts hearing maritime cases
are expected to apply or at least comply with federal maritime law, to an extent
to be discussed below.83 Just as the Erie doctrine compels federal courts to
2005) (finding federal jurisdiction exclusive); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d
38, 42 (D.D.C. 2000) (same).78 The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574 (1874).
79 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986)
("With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law." (citing
Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255 (1972))); see also Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996) (same); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545 (1995) (same).80 See E. River S.S., 476 U.S. at 864 (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397, 407 (1975)).
81 See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953) ("[T]he substantial
rights ... are not to be determined differently whether [the] case is labelled [sic] 'law side'
or 'admiralty side' on a district court's docket."); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317
U.S. 239, 244 (1942) ("[F]ederal courts, when treating maritime torts in actions at law rather
than in suits in admiralty, have also sought to preserve admiralty principles .... ."); Chelentis
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (rejecting an attempt to apply New York
law in a diversity jurisdiction case concerning a maritime injury); Robertson, Displacement
of State Law, supra note 66, at 335-36 (explaining that diversity courts should apply
maritime law); Stevens, supra note 22, at 267-69 (same).82 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 335-36.
83 See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) ("[S]ubstantive
remedies afforded by the States [should] conform to governing federal maritime standards."
(citing William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 34
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apply state law in diversity cases, the reverse-Erie doctrine compels state courts
to apply federal law in maritime cases. In Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,84
the Court opined that the purpose of the Framers was "to place the entire
subject-its substantive as well as its procedural features-under national
control. '85 But in American Dredging Co. v. Miller,86 it endorsed the view that
state courts may apply their own procedural standards in maritime cases. 87
b. Federal Lawmaking
The Constitution granted admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts, but did
not explicitly confer any lawmaking powers. Jurisdictional grants do not
necessarily come with the capacity to create substantive law, as diversity
jurisdiction clearly demonstrates. 88 One could argue that as there is no
difference between the language of the diversity grant and that of the admiralty
grant, 89 they should be similarly construed.90 But the two grants seem to differ
in their underlying purposes. The common stance is that diversity jurisdiction
was intended to provide a neutral forum for litigants, whereas admiralty
jurisdiction was intended primarily to secure uniformity of substantive maritime
law.91 The distinction is reinforced by the fact that diversity jurisdiction is based
(1963) (discussing the reverse-Erie doctrine))); Lizabeth L. Burrell, Application of State Law
to Maritime Claims: Is There a Better Guide than Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen?, 21 TuL.
MAR. L.J. 53, 53-54 (1996) (explaining that state courts must apply federal maritime law to
cases within admiralty jurisdiction); Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 532 (1954) ("[T]he state courts in saving clause cases
must respect the same principles of substantive obligation which the federal courts enforced
in admiralty."); Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 332-37 (explaining
and discussing the reverse-Erie doctrine).
84264 U.S. 375 (1924).
851 Id. at 386.
86510 U.S. 443 (1994).
871d. at 453-54; see also Burrell, supra note 83, at 71-72; Robertson, Displacement of
State Law, supra note 66, at 347, 357, 359-61.
88 See Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981) ("The
vesting of [diversity] jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to
authority to formulate federal common law....").
89 Both derive from U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend
to .... ").
90 See, e.g., Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at 1672-73 ("Like
the... grants of diversity jurisdiction, the Admiralty Clause... and its statutory
counterparts are mere grants of jurisdiction, without any reference to substantive lawmaking
authority."); Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 346 ("[J]urisdictional grants do
not confer power to fashion substantive rules of decision ...").
91 See Currie, supra note 66, at 163 (discussing this distinction). Providing a neutral
forum may be a subsidiary purpose of the admiralty grant. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 n.6 (1995) ("[W]e are unwilling to rule
out that the first Congress saw a value in federal admiralty courts beyond fostering
uniformity of substantive law, stemming, say, from a concern with local bias similar to the
presupposition for diversity jurisdiction.").
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on "the nature of the parties," whereas admiralty jurisdiction is based on the
subject matter of the conflict.92
It is widely accepted that the purpose of the admiralty jurisdiction grant was
to ensure uniformity in maritime law.93 This naturally entails the maintenance
and development of a uniform body of national law. Thus, it is nearly beyond
doubt that the Admiralty Clause empowered federal courts not only to draw on
substantive maritime law but also "to continue the development of this law
within constitutional limits."94 Some contend that federal lawmaking power in
admiralty may derive directly from "strong federal interests in uniform rules to
govern maritime commerce," rather than indirectly from the jurisdictional
grant. 95 Be that as it may, the existence of a lawmaking power is rarely
disputed. The importance of this role was emphasized by Justice Brennan in The
Tungus v. Skovgaard96: "Admiralty law is primarily judge-made law. The
federal courts have a most extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of
substantive law in maritime cases." 97
The Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress any power with respect
to civil maritime law. 98 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the Constitution implicitly empowers Congress to legislate in this field.99
The legislative power derives, first and foremost, from a combination of the
Admiralty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The former vests the
power to adjudicate maritime cases in the federal judiciary, 100 and the latter
empowers Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution... [all] Powers vested by this Constitution in the
92 See J.A.C. Grant, The Search for Uniformity of Law, 32 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 1082,
1091 (1938).93 See Matthew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but Still Unconstitutional: The
Oil Pollution Act's Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,
2 (1997); Swanson, supra note 21, at 380; Haeck, supra note 8, at 202.94 Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959); see also
Currie, supra note 66, at 162 ("[The admiralty grant] gives the federal courts power to
evolve and apply a national substantive law .... ); Robertson, Applicability of State Law,
supra note 66, at 82 (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 360-61); Robertson, Displacement of State
Law, supra note 66, at 326,("[The Constitution] empower[s] the federal courts... to create a
body of national maritime law"); id. at 366 ("Admiralty's traditions emphasize the authority
and duty of federal judges to create maritime law."); Young, Federal Common Law, supra
note 13, at 1642 ("[F]ederal courts have treated the grant of admiralty jurisdiction as creating
a wide-ranging common law jurisdiction.").95 Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at 1643-44.
96358 U.S. 588, 611 (1959).
97 1d. at 611 (citing Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314
(1954)).
98 0n the other hand, the Constitution empowers Congress to define and punish
maritime offenses. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
99 See infra notes 102-03, 105; see also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S.
219, 227 (1924) ("Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law .....
100U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."'' 1
The Court explained in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen'0 2 that "in consequence
of these provisions Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the
maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country." 10 3 Additionally, the
legislative power may be inferred from the Commerce Clause, 10 4 which
allocates to Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States," and arguably covers maritime commerce. 10 5
Congress's legislative power is subject to constitutional constraints. For
instance, maritime legislation cannot encompass issues that do not fall within
admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction. 10 6 A more interesting question is whether
Congress can delegate lawmaking powers to the states. In Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart,10 7 the plaintiff brought an action for a maritime accident under
the Workmen's Compensation Law of New York, based on a 1789 amendment
of the Judiciary Act, whereby the "saving to suitors" clause shall encompass
"the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
State."'1 8 The Court struck down this amendment, holding that Congress cannot
delegate lawmaking powers to the states in a way that imperils constitutionally
mandated uniformity. 10 9 Another amendment, which permitted application of
state workmen's compensation laws to maritime injuries incurred by non-crew
employees, was struck down for the same reason.' 10
101 d. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
102244 U.S. 205 (1917).
'
0 3 Id. at 215; see also Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361
(1959) (explaining that Article III empowered Congress to "revise and supplement the
maritime law"); Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924) ("[T]he
provision was regarded ... as implicitly investing [legislative] power in the United States.");
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1920) (quoting Jensen, 244 U.S. at
215, 225); Harrington, supra note 93, at 20, 30 (explaining that Congress's power may
derive from the Admiralty Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause); Robert D. Peltz,
The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 130 (1996) (same);
Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 82 (same); Robertson, Displacement
of State Law, supra note 66, at 326 (same).
104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10 5 See id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("The power of
Congress, then, comprehends navigation.., so far as that navigation may be, in any manner,
connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States .... ');
Burrell, supra note 83, at 53 & n. 1 (explaining that Congress's power derives from the
Commerce Clause); Harrington, supra note 93, at 20 (same); Paulsen, supra note 68, at 1082
(same); Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 326 n. 1.
106 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932).
107 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
108 Id. at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109d. at 163-64.
10 Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1924); see also
Harrington, supra note 93, at 47.
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c. State Lawmaking
States have a legitimate concern over maritime activities that take place or
have an effect within state borders, including inland waters and territorial
sea,111 and have consequently passed a great deal of legislation on these
matters. 112 The conventional view is that admiralty jurisdiction does not
automatically prohibit or displace state regulation of maritime activities. 113
First, the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act is interpreted not only
as conferring concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty on state courts, but also as
recognizing states' legitimate role in regulating maritime affairs. 114 Second, as
is evident from the analogous Commerce Clause jurisprudence, states' residual
lawmaking power may derive from their well-established police powers. 15 The
Supreme Court made clear in Sligh v. Kirkooda 16 that "there may be legitimate
action by the State in the matter of local regulation, which the State may take
until Congress exercises its authority upon the subject."' 17 State police power
embraces regulations designed to promote public health, morals, and safety, as
well as public convenience or general prosperity-within a state.11 8 State
maritime legislation frequently falls within the states' police powers. 119
In the end, therefore, substantive maritime law may include state law
subject to the overarching need for national uniformity and other federal
interests. 120 Federal courts have on many occasions applied state laws to
maritime disputes. 121 They have done so mainly where federal law was silent,
and there was no urgent need to create a new federal rule to fill the lacuna, 122 or
where the local interest outweighed the federal interest. 123 For example, in
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun,124 the Court decided that in the case
111 See Currie, supra note 66, at 169; Harrington, supra note 93, at 34; Swanson, supra
note 21, at 381; Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 329.112 See Swanson, supra note 21, at 381-82.
113 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545
(1995) ("[E]xercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction does not result in automatic
displacement of state law."); see also Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S.
199, 206 (1996) (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 545); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 90.
114 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 328.
115 See Harrington, supra note 93, at 33.
116237 U.S. 52 (1915).
117Md
" at 58.
118 d at 59 (citing Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912)).
119 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 330.
120 See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545-
46 (1995).
121 Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-61 (1959) (enumerating
incidents in which federal courts applied state law).
122 See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961); Burrell, supra note 83, at
55. 123 See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 741; Burrell, supra note 83, at 55.
124516 U.S. 199 (1996).
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of a wrongful death of a nonseafarer, plaintiffs could pursue remedies under
state law, in excess of the remedies available under maritime law. 125 Moreover,
the Court "left open... the source-federal or state-of the standards
governing liability, as distinguished from the rules on remedies,"' 126 at least
where injury to or death of nonseafarers on territorial waters is concerned. 127
The crucial question is what the boundaries of state lawmaking powers should
be in light of the Constitution and the relevant federal interests or, in other
words, when state law is or ought to be displaced by federal law. This is
essentially the question of supremacy and preemption to which we now turn.
B. Setting the Boundaries Between Federal and State Powers
1. General Preemption
Preemption is a constitutional law doctrine whereby "state and local
[authorities] are deprived of their powers" in particular areas governed by
federal law. 128 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution posits that the laws of
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' 129 The widely held view is that this
clause empowers Congress to preempt state law. 130 According to an alternative
yet unconventional stance, the doctrine of preemption derives from the
Necessary and Proper Clause mentioned above.' 3' Under this clause, if the
legislative end is legitimate and "within the scope of the [C]onstitution, all
means... plainly adapted to that end are constitutional."' 132 So if uniformity in
a particular area is required to attain other legitimate goals of federal legislation,
preemption may be a proper and necessary means of effectuating congressional
powers.133
125Id. at 213-16.
126 Id. at 216 n.14.
127 See Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 101.
128 O'REILLY, supra note 1, at 1.
129 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
130 See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citing Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,138 (1988)); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148 n.2
(1917); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1313, 1316 (2004); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L.
REv. 225, 234 (2000); see also Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 767, 773 (explaining that
Congress's power to preempt state law is assumed to derive from the Supremacy Clause).
Gardbaum himself believes that the power to preempt derives from other sources. Id. at 773-
83. 131 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
132 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
133 Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 781-83; see also Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory
Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 805, 813-14 (1998) (endorsing
Gardbaum's position).
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In a preemption analysis the Supreme Court often invokes a "presumption
against preemption," whereby state police powers cannot be superseded by a
federal statute unless this is "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'1 34
Arguably, this presumption aims to ensure that state power is limited only by
federal bodies in which the states are fairly represented. 135 Thus, a preemption
dispute generally hinges on congressional intent as manifested in federal
legislation.136
Preemption may be either explicit or implicit. 137 "Express preemption"
occurs when Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law. 13 8 Implicit
preemption occurs where preemption is "implicitly contained in [the statute's]
structure and purpose."' 139 The Court recognized at least two types of implied
preemption: (1) "field preemption," where Congress has legislated
comprehensively, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law;14°
and (2) "conflict preemption," where state law conflicts with federal law,
namely if compliance with both is physically impossible. 14 1 Some justices seem
to have identified another type-"frustration preemption," which occurs where
134 See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813 n.8
(1997) (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1994)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 146 (1963) (same); see also Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350
(1933).135 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 333-35.
136 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 ("[T]he 'purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone' in every pre-emption case." (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96
(1992); La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) ("The critical
question ... is ... whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law."
(citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)); Joshua S. Force, Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine: The Supreme
Court Misses the Boat on Maritime Preemption, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 389, 396 (2003).
137 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98; English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)
(distinguishing three types of preemption); La. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 476 U.S. at 368-69
(enumerating various cases of preemption which can be reduced into three or four
categories); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) (discussing different types of preemption).
13 8 See Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 203 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977)); Force, supra note 136, at 396; Harrington, supra note 93, at 26.
"Approximately 350 federal statutes [explicitly] preempt state law." O'REILLY, supra note 1,
at2.
139 Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525).
14 0 See id. (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982)); Rayv. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230);
Force, supra note 136, at 396; Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 808; Harrington, supra note 93,
at 26.
141 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 158 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)); Force, supra note 136, at 396; Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 775,
808; Harrington, supra note 93, at 26.
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state law frustrates the accomplishment of the legislative objectives, 142 but this
is usually viewed as a subspecies of conflict preemption. 143
Not surprisingly, the preemptive effect of federal maritime legislation has
been analyzed in accordance with general preemption principles.' 44 To the
extent that maritime laws are made by Congress, there may be no need for a
special preemption doctrine. However, maritime law raises two unique
questions that call for distinctive treatment. First, should state law be preempted
by contradictory federal judge-made law? Second, could state law be displaced
in the absence of any relevant federal rule, on the grounds that it interferes with
the constitutional imperative of uniformity embodied in the Admiralty Clause?
2. Maritime Preemption
a. The Need for a Special Doctrine
As explained above, states have legitimate interests in regulating maritime
activities. Naturally, state laws may be incompatible with federal maritime
legislation, judge-made maritime law, and the abstract constitutional imperative
of uniformity. This potential clash necessitates a constitutionally sound ruling
method. While traditional preemption analysis may arguably govern the
interrelation between specific federal legislation and state law, it is insufficient
in the maritime arena for at least two reasons.
First, maritime law is the only area in which state law may be preempted by
federal judge-made law without a concrete legislative anchor.145 This raises a
unique concern. States have a fundamental power to provide for their citizens'
welfare. 146 Preemption by Congress may nonetheless be deemed tolerable. To
begin with, it is sanctioned by a politically accountable body in which the state
is represented. 147 States' representation in federal lawmaking bodies generally
insulates their interests. 148 Additionally, the procedural obstacles and
complications of the federal legislative process limit the potential reach of this
142 See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-52 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941); Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 767 n.3, 808 n.206.
143See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (referring to frustration preemption as a subspecies of
conflict preemption); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (same); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (same); Ray, 435 U.S. at 158; Harrington,
supra note 93, at 26 (same).
144See Green v. Indus. Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 639 (La. 1992) ("Where
Congress has spoken in a particular area, courts engage in the familiar pre-emption
analysis."); Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 349-50.
145 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 274.
1461d. at 335.
1 4 7 Id. at 335-36.
148 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985);
Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION
13, 14 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
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type of preemption. 149 These safeguards do not exist with regard to general
maritime law. Preemption by judge-made law is more difficult to justify
because it circumvents the political safeguard, namely representation of the
affected states in the federal lawmaking process, as well as the procedural
obstacles. 150 While only a few commentators believe this type of preemption
should be abandoned, 151 courts ought to be cautious when considering
preemption of state law for lack of conformity with judge-made rules.
Second, general preemption analysis hinges on judicial interpretation of
specific federal legislation. Courts examine the language, structure, and
legislative history of the statute in hand to determine whether Congress
explicitly or implicitly ordered displacement of state law. On the other hand,
maritime preemption always involves the general constitutional imperative to
maintain uniformity of maritime law within the United States. 152 That is
probably why the presumption against preemption mentioned above does not
generally apply in maritime contexts. 153 I will elaborate on the constitutional
imperative below. At this stage, suffice it to say that, in maritime preemption
analysis, an overarching need for subject-matter uniformity accompanies the
concrete policy embodied in the relevant federal statute or judge-made rule.
This Article focuses mainly on this feature, making the proposed theoretical
framework highly pertinent to other legal unification and harmonization
projects, in the United States and elsewhere.
It should be emphasized at the outset that while federal law, including
judge-made law, is generally supreme under Article VI of the Constitution,
admiralty jurisdiction and the resultant federal lawmaking powers do not
automatically displace state law. 154 For instance, in Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc.,155 the Supreme Court recognized states' interest in
oil spill regulation and concluded that Florida's oil spill statute was not
preempted by federal law, because only the former provided a remedy for
pollution-related loss other than federal cleanup costs. 156
b. The Jensen Formula
The exact boundaries of state lawmaking powers with respect to maritime
law have been the subject of extensive judicial debate. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen157 is the landmark decision on maritime preemption. The dependents of
149 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 337.
150 See Young, Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at 1657, 1659; Young, Preemption
at Sea, supra note 13, at 276-77, 305, 309, 328-29, 336-37, 343.
151 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 279.
152 See infra Part III.A. 1.
153 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
15 4 See supra Part II.A.2.c.
155411 U.S. 325 (1973).
156Id. at 328-29, 332-36.
157244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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a longshoreman killed while unloading cargo from a ship sued the employer
under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act. 158 The defendant
contended, inter alia, that allowing recovery under New York law would violate
the Admiralty Clause.' 59 Justice McReynolds acknowledged, based on The
Lottawanna,160 that the Constitution viewed maritime law as "a system of law
coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country," not to be
placed "under the disposal and regulation of the several States."'161 On the other
hand, he admitted that general maritime law could be modified or affected by
state legislation to some extent. 162 The oft-cited conclusion was that "no [state
law] is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of
Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations."' 63 Hence, state law is
preempted in one of three cases: (1) if it conflicts with the express or implied
intent of Congress; (2) if it prejudices characteristic features of general maritime
law; (3) if it interferes with the harmony and uniformity of maritime law.
The first component of the three-prong test may be implemented in
accordance with general preemption principles. Put differently, a court should
ask whether state law was explicitly preempted by an act of Congress, and if not
whether Congress has legislated comprehensively, leaving no room for the
states to supplement federal law, and whether state law conflicts with federal
law.' 64 In Yamaha Motor Corp., US.A. v. Calhoun,165 the Court held without
reference to Jensen that damages for wrongful death of non-seafarers on state
territorial waters may be governed by state statutes because Congress did not
prescribe "a comprehensive tort recovery regime to be uniformly applied" to
this matter. 166 This language seems consistent with traditional field preemption
analysis.
In American Dredging Co. v. Miller,167 the Court instilled some content
into the other two components of Jensen. It first held that a particular rule or
principle is not a characteristic feature of general maritime law if it neither
originated nor has exclusive application in maritime law. 168 Applying this test,
Justice Scalia concluded that the doctrine of forum non conveniens did not
15 8 Id. at 207-10.
159 Id. at 209-10, 212.
16088 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
161Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id. at 216.
163 1d. In fact, the Jensen formulation was taken almost verbatim from The City of
Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
164 See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text.
165 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
166Id. at 215-16.
167 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
168 Id. at 449-50.
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originate in maritime law and had become a doctrine of general application. 169
Thus, state refusal to apply this doctrine did not prejudice a "characteristic
feature" of the general maritime law. 170 However, it is unclear from Miller
whether a doctrine must both originate and have exclusive application in
maritime law to qualify as a characteristic feature, or if each of the two
conditions is sufficient in itself. 171
The Court also examined whether state law would interfere with "the proper
harmony and uniformity" of maritime law in its international and interstate
relations. 172 It answered in the negative for two reasons. First, the relevant
maritime rule was procedural rather than substantive, and maritime law aims at
uniformity of substance-not procedure.173 Second, "the discretionary nature of
the doctrine [and the variety of] factors relevant to its application make
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.' ' 174 And if the
maritime doctrine itself does not provide uniformity, it seems unreasonable to
preempt contradictory state law for the sake of uniformity.
Jensen has rarely been cited in recent case law and has been discredited by
some as being elusive or even redundant, 175 but it has nonetheless retained its
vitality for almost a century. 176 Even if not strictly adhered to, Jensen remains
the guiding light. State law cannot be applied if its application disrupts the
essential harmony and uniformity of maritime law, even in the absence of
relevant federal legislation. 177 As explained above, substantive law in maritime
cases does not normally depend on the particular forum. So Jensen and its
progeny "appl[y] with equal force in federal and state courts" to limit the
validity and applicability of state law. 178
c. Practical Distinctions
Justice McReynolds admitted in Jensen that "it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may
1691Id
17°Id. at 450.
171 See Friedell, supra note 27, at 843.
172 Miller, 510 U.S. at 450-51.
173 Id. at 453-54.
1741d. at 453,455.
17 5 See id. at 461 (Stevens J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("We
should jettison Jensen's special maritime pre-emption doctrine .... ); Robertson,
Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 88 n.43 (discussing the critical judicial
comments).
176See, e.g., Miller, 510 U.S. at 447; Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U.S. 325, 344 (1973) ("Jensen thus has vitality left."); Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI,
310 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Amtrak "Sunset Limited" Train Crash, 121 F.3d
1421, 1425 (1 1th Cir. 1997); Rodrigue v. LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 252 (La. 1990).177 See Harrington, supra note 93, at 47.
178See Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 87-88; Robertson,
Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 331.
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be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation."' 179 Jensen tried to set
general guidelines, but the formulation was quite elusive, 180 and the exact
boundaries of state power to regulate maritime activities and events have
remained somewhat obscure. Many years later, in an oft-cited paragraph, the
Court acknowledged that "[iut would be idle to pretend that the line separating
permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our
admiralty jurisprudence."' 181 The Louisiana Supreme Court fairly complained
that "[d]espite this multitude of cases involving the applicability of state law in
maritime situations, the Court has developed no clear test for determining when
such application is appropriate and when it violates the [C]onstitution."' 182 One
commentator, who surveyed all maritime preemption cases from Jensen to
Yamaha, concluded that "the Court's opinions [on maritime preemption] do not
give intelligible reasons, just conclusions," and that even if we attempted to
discern useful patterns by viewing the aggregate results "this body of
jurisprudence discloses few useful patterns." 183 Given the generality of the
Jensen formula and the case-by-case nature of preemption analysis, the
obscurity of the law does not seem surprising. But while there may not be a
coherent explanation for the whole body of case law, several distinctions may
be helpful.
The first distinction is between rights and remedies. I have explained that
the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act confers concurrent
jurisdiction in admiralty on state courts, but it does so for an express purpose,
namely to give maritime suitors access to state law remedies. 184 Thus, states
must have much more latitude in supplementing or modifying the available
remedies than they have with regard to primary rights and duties. Indeed, one
year after Jensen, in Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 185 Justice
McReynolds proclaimed that "[t]he distinction between rights and remedies is
fundamental."'1 86 Although under the "saving to suitors" clause rights
179S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
180 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 332 ("It is too general
and elastic to answer any questions .... ").
181 Miller, 510 U.S. at 452; see also Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S.
199, 210 n.8 (1996) (citing Miller, 510 U.S. at 452); Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk
Dredging Co., 594 F.3d 832, 839 n.16 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Cent. Int'l Co. v. Kemper
Nat'l Ins. Cos., 202 F.3d 372, 373 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505,
524 n.17 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8); Bank of San Pedro v. Forbes
Westar, Inc., 53 F.3d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Miller, 510 U.S. at 452); Ballard
Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624, 628 (1st Cir. 1994) (adding that
"[d]iscerning the law in this area is far from easy; one might tack a sailboat into a fog bank
with more confidence").
182 Rodrigue v. LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1990).
183 Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 90; see also id. at 95-96
(showing that any attempt "to synthesize this body of jurisprudence [is] untenable").
18 4 See supra Part II.A.1.b.
185 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
186Id. at 384.
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recognized in maritime law can be enforced through common law remedies, the
rights and duties of the parties must always be assessed under federal maritime
law. 187 In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,188 the Court similarly held that
the "saving to suitors" clause actually saved "all means other than proceedings
in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury
involved," but did not sanction "attempted changes by the States in the
substantive admiralty law."'189 The Supreme Court's enforcement of state
wrongful death legislation may be explained, accordingly, as allowing state
remedies for conduct that was already deemed wrongful under maritime law. 190
The distinction between rights and remedies in maritime preemption analysis
was challenged in an obiter dictum in Yamaha, where in a unique fact situation
involving the wrongful death of a non-seafarer, the Court "left open.., the
source-federal or state--of the standards governing liability, as distinguished
from the rules on remedies."' 191
The second distinction is between cases in which federal rules apply to the
question at hand and cases of lacuna. Common sense dictates more leeway for
the states in the latter case. In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,192 the Court applied
California wrongful death legislation to a fatal accident that occurred on state
navigable waters, explaining that maritime law "leaves the matter
untouched."'193 This expression was later interpreted as embodying a "gap
theory," whereby if federal maritime law provides a rule of decision, whether
allowing or denying recovery, state law has no place, but if there is a "gap" or a
"void," state law can be applied to fill it.194 Sometimes Congress explicitly
allows gap-filling, 195 but this is not indispensable. The gap theory was applied
in subsequent cases. For example, in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co., 19 6 the Court observed that there was no federal maritime rule on
breach of warranties in marine insurance policies, 197 and therefore opted for
state insurance law on this matter.198
187M.; see also Stevens, supra note 22, at 252 ("[T]he 'saving clause' was aimed merely
at preserving the right of suitors to the remedies of the common law courts, the rights of the
parties therein to be derived from a uniform body of general maritime law.").
188264 U.S. 109 (1924).
189 d. at 123-24.
190 See Currie, supra note 66, at 188.
191 Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 201-02, 216 n.14 (1996).
192257 U.S. 233 (1921).
193Id. at 240, 242.
194 See Currie, supra note 66, at 167.
195 See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) ("To
the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this [Act] or with other Federal
laws ... [the] laws of each adjacent State... are declared to be the law of the United States
for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf ... .
196 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
197Id. at 314-16.
198Id. at 321.
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The gap theory has also been criticized on various grounds. First, it has
limited support in the case law. As one commentator noted, "Jensen and its
immediate progeny refused to allow state law to fill perhaps the biggest 'gap'
that has ever existed in the maritime law-the absence of a workers'
compensation remedy."' 199 Even when Congress explicitly recognized states'
power to provide workmen's compensation for maritime accidents, this
empowerment was found unconstitutional.200 Second, the very distinction
between decided and undecided issues is often artificial. The absence of a right
of action in maritime law is not necessarily a "void." It may be interpreted as a
conscious decision not to recognize that right.201 Third, in the absence of a
concrete maritime rule, federal courts may prefer to create one rather than apply
state law,20 2 and the gap theory does not tell them which path should be taken in
the particular case.20 3 Fourth, the outcome generally depends on whether the
issue was previously adjudicated,204 not on a thorough analysis of relevant
federal and state interests. This makes the gap theory quite arbitrary.
The third distinction is between predominantly local and predominantly
national issues. In Garcia,20 5 the Court opined that death upon navigable waters
within a state "is maritime and local in character," so that state modification of
maritime law on this subject does not "work material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations."206 Under the "maritime but local" theory, the states may regulate
maritime matters that fall predominantly within local concern. It allows state
law to apply even in the face of conflicting federal law, as long as the matter is
sufficiently local.20 7 The rationale seems simple. Regarding incidents of a local
nature, national uniformity is not needed because the parties cannot be
19 9 Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 96; see also Currie, supra
note 66, at 168 (observing that while wrongful death was an untouched area, "a death
remedy" was denied in workmen's compensation decisions).200 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
201 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 341 (explaining that it is
often hard to tell the difference between "no rule of recovery" and "a rule of no recovery").
In Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), the Court examined the applicability of a state
survival statute, in view of a maritime law rule that abated a cause of action upon the
tortfeasor's death. The respondent said that in Garcia there was no maritime wrongful death
scheme (a gap), whereas in this case there was a maritime law rule barring survival (no gap).
Id. at 391. The Court held that "[t]his is a subtlety which we think does not merit judicial
adoption. The admiralty rule in the case of wrongful death can be stated either negatively or
positively, and the result does not turn on the mere mode of expression." Id.202 In Wilburn Boat, the Court examined whether in the absence of an existing rule it
should fashion one, and declined to do so. 348 U.S. at 314, 320.
20 3 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 340-41.
2 0 4 See Currie, supra note 66, at 168.
205257 U.S. 233 (1921).
206Id. at 242.
20 7 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 340.
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subjected to varying legal regimes anyway.20 8 Of course, this theory may be
difficult to apply. On the one hand, almost every conduct and every outcome are
of local concern. On the other hand, maritime activities of local concern might
have an impact on the federal level. It is therefore hard to determine whether a
particular type of incident is sufficiently local. 20 9 Four decades after Garcia, the
Court admitted that "[n]o dependable definition of the area-described as
'maritime but local,' or 'of local concern'-where state laws could apply ever
emerged from the many cases which dealt with the matter." 2 10 In fact, cases
with similarly local nature were decided differently. 2
11
The fourth distinction is between state common law and legislation.
Arguably, state statutes have a stronger claim to applicability in maritime cases
than state common law because they are generally more coherent and more
likely to fall within state police powers, and because they have more democratic
roots.2 12 Jensen itself was actually phrased as a test for state statute validity,2 13
even though it was later applied to state law in general, and the distinction
between state legislation and common law has some support in the case law.
2 14
Needless to say, the authorities do not categorically preclude application of state
common law. 2
15
It is often maintained that the ultimate test for maritime preemption is one
of balancing federal and state interests. In Kossick v. United Fruit Co. ,216 the
Court opined that a preemption analysis is "one of accommodation... a process
somewhat analogous to the normal conflict of laws situation where two
sovereigns assert divergent interests in a transaction as to which both have some
concern." 2 17 Under this view, the court is expected to assure that the federal
interest is properly assessed and accorded due weight. 2 18 This decision has been
208 See Currie, supra note 66, at 179.
209 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 34 1.
2 10 Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 119 (1962).
211 See Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 95-96 (showing that a
different conclusion was reached in two cases with an equally local nature).
2 12 See Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 345.
2 13 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
2 14 See, e.g., Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1280 (1st Cir. 1993)
("Maritime law historically has appreciated the leading role of state statutes in creating
additional bases of recovery."); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1981) (explaining
that a federal court might be more willing to override a common law rule); see also James P.
Laughlin, Choice of Law in the Federal Admiralty Court, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 165, 181
(1979) (presenting the distinction).
2 15Byrd, 657 F.2d at 617 ("[A]dmiralty law, at times, looks to state law, either statutory
or decisional, to supply the rule of decision where there is no admiralty rule on point.").
216365 U.S. 731 (1961).
2 171d. at 738-39.
2 18 1d. at 739.
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
interpreted as endorsing an interest-balancing test.219 While it may serve as an
independent criterion in preemption analysis, some contend that the interest
balancing test simply helps determine whether the case is sufficiently local, so
that the "maritime but local" test is met.220 Either way, applying an interest-
balancing test within a preemption analysis is extremely difficult because it is
frequently hard to identify all relevant interests, and even when identifiable the
state interest and the federal interest are generally immeasurable, and clearly
incommensurable. 221 Justice Scalia, who discussed the balancing test in the
context of the Commerce Clause, concluded: "[I]t is more like judging whether
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.
222
3. A Test Case: Economic Loss Arising from Oil Pollution
a. Pre-OPA Law
An interesting example of a discussion of the preemptive force of judge-
made maritime law is found in the Exxon Valdez litigation. More than two
decades ago the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast,
spilling eleven million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.223 At the
time, this was considered the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history.224
The main question that entailed a preemption analysis in subsequent civil
litigation was whether purely economic losses resulting from the spill were
recoverable. Aquatic pollutions may have harsh and widespread repercussions.
In addition to harm to wildlife and natural resources, property damage, and
possibly bodily injuries, various economic losses may ensue. Commercial
fishermen, oystermen, crabbers, and the like, may lose their livelihood.
Customers of these fishermen, such as seafood restaurants, retail shops, or
canned food manufacturers, may incur additional expenses or even shut down
temporarily, and suppliers of services and goods to the local fishing industry
may lose profit. Owners of shoreline hotels, resorts, recreational areas, and
other tourist-based businesses may suffer economic loss. Owners and charterers
of ships unable to sail across the area of the spill, as well as owners of cargo
219 See, e.g., Green v. Indus. Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634, 638 (La. 1992) ("[S]tate
law may be applied where the state's interest in a matter is greater than the federal
interest."); Friedell, supra note 27, at 841; Swanson, supra note 21, at 385.
220 See Burrell, supra note 83, at 69 (internal quotation marks omitted); Robertson,
Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 342. This, in fact, is how the Court in Kossick,
365 U.S. at 738-39, used this test.
221 See Friedell, supra note 27, at 841; Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra
note 66, at 343-44; Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 300.
222 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
223 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476, 478 (2008).
22 4 See George J. Church, The Big Spill: Bred from Complacency, the Valdez Fiasco
Goes from Bad to Worse to Worst Possible, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 38.
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delayed by the obstacle, may incur loss. Those involved in the real estate
industry in coastal states, such as builders, real estate agents, bankers, and
lawyers, may face a decline in business. Suppliers, customers, employees, and
relatives of any of the above may lose profits or incur unanticipated expenses.
Alas, purely economic losses are generally irrecoverable in general
maritime law under Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint225 and its
progeny. 226 This exclusionary rule, when applied to marine pollution, has a
single well-defined exception. Courts have consistently allowed commercial
fishermen, oystermen, crabbers, etc., to recover for lost fishing profits following
a tortious diminution of aquatic life.227 Thus, in the Exxon Valdez litigation,
Exxon's liability to commercial fishermen was undisputed,228 but other claims
were dismissed by the federal district courts under Robins Dry Dock.229
In an attempt to circumvent the harsh implications of Robins Dry Dock,
many claimants invoked relevant federal and state legislation. The main federal
statutory venue was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA).230
The Act imposed strict liability for damages resulting from marine pollutions,
apparently without the Robins Dry Dock limit,231 but set rigid liability caps. In
the case of a discharge from a vessel, liability could not exceed $100 million, of
which the owner and operator of the vessel were liable for the first $14 million,
225275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
226See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.
1985); Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1573, 1578-79.
227 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974); see also, e.g., Slaven v.
BP Am. Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 861 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the exception was not
affected by East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986),
a products liability case); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973)
(allowing fishermen's recovery under a theory of public nuisance); Curd v. Mosaic
Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216, 1227-28 (Fla. 2010) (allowing recovery in negligence).
22 8 See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-V, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *21, *23
(D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1511, 1518 (D. Alaska
1991).
22 9 See Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez
Litigation, 45 GA. L. REv. 409, 457-59 (2011).
23043 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (2006).
23 1 Slaven, 786 F. Supp. at 858-60; Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515; In re Glacier
Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (D. Alaska 1990); see also In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *13 (D. Alaska Dec. 23, 1992). But see Benefiel v. Exxon
Corp., No. 90-2184, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 1990)
(holding that Robins Dry Dock applies to claims under TAPAA). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision without directly discussing the applicability of
Robins Dry Dock. It held that plaintiffs' losses were "remote and derivative" and fell
"outside the zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect when it passed
TAPAA." Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992); see also David P.
Lewis, Note, The Limits of Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover Pure Economic
Loss?, 10 ALASKA L. REv. 87, 116-30 (1993) (supporting the district court's position).
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and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund was liable for the balance. 232
Robins Dry Dock applied to any damages in excess of the $100 million
recoverable under the TAPAA. 233
Some of the claims were based on the Alaska Environmental Conservation
Act,234 which imposes strict liability for damages-including economic
losses-caused by an unauthorized release of hazardous substances. A
controversy emerged regarding the possible preemption of this provision by
general maritime law. Under Jensen, state legislation may incidentally affect
maritime affairs, unless it "contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an
act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations."235 The district court in
Alaska held that Robins Dry Dock applied to claims brought against Exxon
under the Alaska Act, because state law may not conflict with federal maritime
law. 236 Other courts, interpreting comparable legislation in other states in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, including the Fifth Circuit, reached similar
conclusions. 237
232 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 204(c)(3), 87 Stat.
576, 587 (1973), repealed by Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 8102(a)(1),
104 Stat. 484, 565. Although the OPA repealed the liability language of TAPAA applicable
to vessel owners and operators, the 1973 Act governed claims arising from the Exxon
Valdez spill. § 8102(c), 104 Stat. at 567.
233 Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515; see also Exxon Valdez, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22495, at *13.234 ALAsKA STAT. ANN. §§ 46.03.822-.824 (West 2011).
235S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
236 Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515; see also In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-
CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *5-6 (D. Alaska Jan. 26, 1994); Exxon Valdez, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *17-20. More accurately, the court held that Robins Dry Dock
only applied to claims under the Alaska Act against entities not liable under TAPAA and
claims against entities liable under TAPAA in excess of TAPAA's $100 million cap. The
Alaska Act was technically not preempted by TAPAA to the extent of TAPAA's $100
million liability because the remedy was uniform whether a claim was brought under the
Alaska Act or under TAPAA. However, the vessel owner and operator are liable for only
$14 million under TAPAA. Thus, in a subsequent decision the same court explained that
damages claimed against the vessel-interest-defendants (as opposed to the Fund) under
either TAPAA or the Alaska Act in excess of $14 million were subject to the application of
Robins Dry Dock. In re Glacier Bay, 865 F. Supp. 629, 637 (D. Alaska 1991).
237 See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031-32 (5th Cir.
1985). The court in that case held that the
federal interest in protecting maritime commerce is often best served by the
establishment of uniform rules of conduct. We believe that such is the case here. The
Robins rule has proved to be a workable and useful tool in our maritime jurisprudence.
To permit recovery here on state law grounds would undermine the principles we seek
to preserve today.
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However, both the Supreme Court of Alaska and the Ninth Circuit on
appeal from the District Court of Alaska decided that Robins Dry Dock did not
preempt liability for purely economic loss under state legislation, 238 and this
seems to be the dominant view today.239 According to this stance, the
exclusionary rule enunciated in Robins Dry Dock is not a "characteristic
feature" of maritime law because it neither originated nor has exclusive
application in maritime law.240 Moreover, to determine whether state law
"interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity" of maritime law, the court
needs to apply a balancing test that weighs state and federal interests on a case-
by-case basis. 241 The balance in the case tips in favor of the state: "Alaska's
strong interest in protecting its waters and providing remedies for damages
resulting from oil spills outweighs the diminished federal interest in achieving
interstate harmony through the uniform application of Robins."242 In fact,
abrogating Robins Dry Dock beyond the $100 million cap under TAPAA would
provide greater uniformity than applying one rule up to this cap and another rule
above it.243 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's rulings
on this issue and remanded the case for reconsideration of several economic
loss claims under Alaska law.2 44 Following this decision, Exxon apparently
settled these claims.245
b. The OPA Era
Congress attempted to enact comprehensive oil pollution legislation from
the mid-1970s, and several bills were introduced and discussed by the late
Id. The court reiterated this stance in a slightly different context in IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E.
Lee Steamship, 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1993); see also In re Oriental Republic Uru.,
821 F. Supp. 950, 955-56 (D. Del. 1993) (discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6207); In re
Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F. Supp. 359, 364-66, 368-69 (D.R.I. 1993) (interpreting the
Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.3-.4
(1991)).
2381n re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1251-53 (9th Cir. 2001); Kodiak Island
Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 767-69 (Alaska 1999).
239 See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994)
(finding that the Rhode Island Act is not preempted by the Admiralty Clause); Slaven v. BP
Am. Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 864-65 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that state law claims that go
beyond Robins are not preempted); cf In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 697,
702-05 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that maritime law does not preempt New Jersey's common
law, which does not automatically deny recovery for purely economic loss).
240Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1251; Kodiak, 991 P.2d at 767.
24 1 Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1251.
2421d. at 1252-53 (citing Kodiak, 991 P.2d at 769); Slaven, 786 F. Supp. at 864-65.
243 See Slaven, 786 F. Supp. at 864.
244Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1253.
245See, e.g., Sea Hawk Seafoods v. Exxon Corp., 484 F.3d 1098, 1099-100 (9th Cir.
2007) (noting that a claim brought by a seafood processor under Alaska law was settled).
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1980S. 246 Only the Exxon Valdez catastrophe and a series of smaller, highly
publicized oil spills in subsequent months galvanized public and political
support for legislative reform. 247 The Oil Pollution Act248 was approved by the
Senate by a vote of 99-0, and by the House of Representatives by a vote of
360-0, and was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush on August 18,
1990.249
The OPA provides that
each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or
which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the
navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is
liable for the removal costs and damages ... that result from such incident. '250
In the case of a vessel, the "responsible party" is the owner, operator, or demise
charterer of the vessel.251
The responsible party is liable, first, for removal costs incurred by the
United States, a state, or an Indian tribe, and by any person who carries out
cleanup activities in accordance with the National Contingency Plan.252 In
addition, the OPA enumerates six categories of recoverable "damages," which
include loss of subsistence use of natural resources, loss of taxes, royalties,
rents, fees or net profit shares (recoverable by the United States or a state), and
loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to an injury to property or
natural resources. 253 While the OPA does not clarify which classes of claimants
are covered by the "loss of profits" provision, the conventional view is that it
completely supersedes Robins Dry Dock and allows recovery for purely
2 4 6 See ENVTL. LAW INST., OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK 3, 195 (1991); Beth Van
Hanswyk, The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in United States Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 319, 338-40
(1988); Sidney A. Wallace & Temple L. Ratcliffe, Water Pollution Laws: Can They Be
Cleaned Up?, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1343, 1361-62, 1366-67 (1983); Elizabeth R. Millard, Note,
Anatomy of an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 338-40 (1993).
247 Although a series of smaller spills occurred later in 1989 and 1990, the Exxon
Valdez incident was undoubtedly the main catalyst. See Harrington, supra note 93, at 7-8;
Lawrence I. Kiem, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TULt. MAR. L.J. 481, 482 (2000).
248 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006).
249 See Millard, supra note 246, at 368; Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 11-12 n.68 (1990).
250 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
25 11d. § 2701(32)(A).
252Id §§ 2701(19), 2702(b)(1).
253 Id § 2702(b)(2).
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economic losses resulting from oil spills, 254 presumably subject to a proximate
causation requirement. 255
The OPA generally limits a responsible party's liability. For example, in the
case of a discharge from a large double-hull vessel, liability is limited to the
greater of $1,900 per gross ton or $16 million.256 The statutory limits do not
apply if the incident was caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct of
the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party; or by
violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regulation
by any of these parties.257 The OPA liability cap is further curtailed by the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which consolidated, enhanced, and superseded
previously existing oil spill compensation funds.258 The Fund does not
guarantee full compensation to oil spill victims. First, it can pay only up to $1
billion per incident.259 This amount may be sufficient in the vast majority of
cases, but it is clearly inadequate in catastrophic incidents like the recent
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Second, the billion dollar fund may be depleted by
payments for harm to natural resources (up to $500 million) and removal costs.
This may leave many individual victims with only a forlorn hope of recovery.
Apart from common law remedies, most coastal states have oil pollution
legislation with strict-often uncapped-liability provisions. 260 State legislation
254 See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252 (9th Cir. 2001); Ballard Shipping Co.
v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630-31 (1st Cir. 1994); Sekco Energy, Inc. v. MV
Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014-15 (E.D. La. 1993); Harrington, supra note 93,
at 8-13; Kiein, supra note 247, at 531-32; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 249, at 15; Steven
R. Swanson, OPA 90 + 10: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 After Ten Years, 32 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 135, 152-55 (2001); Sturla Olsen, Comment, Recovery for the Lost Use of Water
Resources: M/V Testbank on the Rocks?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 271, 286-88 (1992). But cf In re
Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 678-79 (E.D. Mich 1992) ("[Section 33 U.S.C.
2702(b)(2)(E)] allows damages only for 'loss of profits... due to the injury, destruction, or
loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources.' None of the claimants.., have
alleged 'injury, destruction, or loss' to their property.").255 See Olsen, supra note 254, at 287.
25633 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1).
257 1d. § 2704(c)(1). Additionally, the caps do not apply if the responsible party failed or
refused to report the incident, to provide reasonable cooperation and assistance in cleanup
efforts, or to comply with orders issued with regard to cleanup. Id. § 2704(c)(2).
258 26 id. § 9509(a).
2 591d. § 9509(c)(2)(A).
2 60 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 46.03.822-.824 (West 2011); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 8670.3, 8670.56.5 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6207-6209 (West 2001); FLA.
STAT. §§ 376.12, 376.313 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-51 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 128D-6 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2004, :2025-:2026 (2011); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, §§ 543, 551-552 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., ENvIR. §§ 4-401 to -410 (West
2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 5 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 146-
A:1-:17 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-:23.11g (West 2011); N.Y. NAY. LAW § 181
(McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.83 to -215.94 (2009); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 468B.300-.335 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12-21 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-
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naturally varies with respect to recoverable losses (purely economic losses in
particular), liability caps, defenses, etc.261 The enactment of the OPA rekindled
the debate on the interplay between federal and state law. The House of
Representatives' bill stated that "except as provided in this Act no action arising
out of a discharge of oil... may be brought in any court of the United States or
of any State"; 262 but following staunch opposition of the Senate, environmental
groups, the National Association of Attorneys General, and others, an
amendment to preserve state power was introduced and ultimately passed.263
The Senate bill similarly preserved states' authority to impose additional
liability.2 64 The compromise bill reported by the conference committee
unsurprisingly included a non-preemption clause.265 The OPA thus provided
that it should not be interpreted "as preempting[] the authority of any
State... from imposing any additional liability... with respect to the discharge
of oil. . . within such State" or as modifying "the obligations or liabilities of
any person under... State law, including common law."266 This clause
explicitly preserved existing state common law and oil pollution legislation, and
allowed subsequent expansion of liability by the states.267
One of the main questions that follow is whether purely economic losses in
excess of the OPA limit can be recovered under state law. A positive answer
may increase polluters' overall liability considerably, especially in cases of
catastrophic spills. More importantly, non-preemption may result in an
inconsistent array of state legislation, impairing uniformity 268 and making
liability depend on the locality of the spill. 269 Admittedly, the OPA has not put
an end to the controversy over the possible preemption of state statutes by
580 to -600 (2008); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.202 (West 2011), and TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 26.265 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18 (West 2006); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 90.56.360, 90.56.370 (West 2004); see also Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi
Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1448 (E.D. Va. 1996) (observing that
when OPA was enacted, twenty-four states had oil spill liability legislation, of which
seventeen had no liability limits).
261 See Harrington, supra note 93, at 3, 54, 61-62.
2 62 H.R. Res. 1465, 101st Cong. § 109(a)(1) (as reported by H. Comm. on Sci., Space, &
Tech., Sept. 20, 1989).
263 See Millard, supra note 246, at 351-54 (discussing the preemption provision).
264Id. at 360-61.
265 Id. at 364.
266 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2006).
267 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000) (holding that § 2718(a) was
intended to preserve state laws and powers only with respect to liability and financial
requirements). Moreover, the OPA superseded the Limitation of Shipowner Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512 (2006), which could limit liability under state law prior to OPA's
enactment. 33 id. § 2718; see also Kiem, supra note 247, at 530. The OPA also provides that
it should not affect or be construed to affect "the authority of any State to establish, or to
continue in effect, a fund... [that pays] for costs or damages arising out of... oil
pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 2718(b).268 See Harrington, supra note 93, at 2, 18-20.
269 See id. at 3.
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Robins Dry Dock. Some interpret the OPA as allowing the states to extend
liability not only beyond the OPA limits, but also beyond general maritime law,
including Robins Dry Dock.270 Others believe that state power is still subject to
Jensen, so there can be no liability for purely economic loss in violation of
Robins Dry Dock.271 Some follow the authority of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart,272 holding that given the Framers' intent-manifested in the Admiralty
Clause of the Constitution-to secure uniformity in maritime law, Congress
cannot delegate its legislative power in this area to the states;273 the OPA's
delegation of power, which imperils uniformity, is therefore unconstitutional.274
In fact, this is not a preemption line of argument at all, because it does not turn
on a conflict between federal and state law, but on the unconstitutionality of an
act of Congress.
III. THE NEW GUIDEPOST
A. Building Blocks
1. The Constitutional Imperative of Uniformity
Preemption is a constitutional law doctrine that limits state lawmaking
powers in particular areas governed by federal law. While general preemption
principles derive from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, maritime
preemption doctrine derives primarily from a purposive interpretation of the
Admiralty Clause. To understand the limits of state lawmaking power in
admiralty, we must begin with an in-depth analysis of the purpose of the
admiralty grant. In the landmark case of The Lottawanna,275 Justice Bradley
deemed one thing unquestionable: "[T]he Constitution must have referred to a
system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country." 276 The Framers did not intend
to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation
of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial
character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign
states.277
270 See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252 (9th Cir. 2001); Ballard Shipping
Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630-31 (1st Cir. 1994).2 71 See Swanson, supra note 21, at 411-15.
272253 U.S. 149 (1920).
273 Id. at 164.
274 See Harrington, supra note 93, at 2-3, 21, 30-52, 71-72.
27588 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
2761d. at 575.
2771Jd
"
2011]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In other words, the purpose of the Admiralty Clause was to maintain
uniformity of maritime law within the United States. 278 To achieve this goal,
federal lawmaking powers-judicial and legislative-must be part and parcel of
admiralty jurisdiction,279 and state law must naturally succumb to federal
maritime law, at least to some extent.
The traditional interpretation of the Admiralty Clause can be challenged
from several angles. Arguably, uniformity of civil maritime law was not the real
purpose of the constitutional grant. First, admiralty jurisdiction, just like
diversity jurisdiction, could have been intended to secure a neutral forum for
litigants rather than uniform substantive law.2 80 Second, the Framers might have
been concerned with uniformity mainly with regard to public matters-crimes
committed on the high seas (such as smuggling and piracy) and taxation-not
with regard to private maritime disputes. 281 Moreover, one may argue that
general maritime law was not truly "federal" law, and therefore could not
properly supersede state law under the Constitution.282 Finally, one may
challenge the view that an abstract interest like uniformity, as opposed to
concrete federal interests, can justify preemption of state law. 283 Despite all
that, the idea that the Admiralty Clause was intended to secure uniformity, and
that the need for uniformity justifies preemption, has remained the conventional
view for more than a century. 284
The desire to reduce diversity among legal systems with respect to
commerce is as old as cross-boundary trade.2 85 It has numerous manifestations
in U.S. legal history, amplifying to some extent its legitimacy as a national
objective. To begin with, uniformity can be pursued through the creation of
2 78 See infra note 284.
279 See supra Part II.A.2.b.
280 See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,
546 n.6 (1995) (opining that admiralty jurisdiction, just like diversity jurisdiction, may have
been intended to secure an unbiased forum).
281 See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 13, at 314-16, 326-27.
282 See id. at 317-25, 327.
2 83 See id. at 343.
2 84 See Currie, supra note 66, at 163, 172 (noting that "[uniformity] is the primary
justification for a federal common law of the sea" and that "a uniform law was apparently
one reason for the establishment of the admiralty jurisdiction."); Harrington, supra note 93,
at 2 ("[T]he primary purpose of the constitutional grant of admiralty power to the federal
government was to ensure the application of a uniform substantive admiralty law throughout
the nation."); Swanson, supra note 21, at 380-81, 407 ("Admiralty jurisdiction was given to
the federal courts to insure a uniform application of the law .... [The founders]
understandably chose to delimit an area of law that would provide uniformity .... [T]he
importance of uniformity remains unquestioned."); Haeck, supra note 8, at 183, 203 ("The
U.S. Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 established federal jurisdiction over
maritime torts in order to provide a uniform set of rules for those who wished to conduct
maritime commerce .... Admiralty tort jurisdiction was originally established to provide a
uniform set of rules .... ").
285 See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 744 (1999).
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federal law, the "Supreme Law of the Land. '286 Indeed, the arguments for
preemption are often rooted in an aspiration for national uniformity.287 The
need for uniformity of the law applicable to interstate commerce was
recognized, inter alia, within the Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 288 It also
motivated the Supreme Court to hold in Swift v. Tyson that federal courts
hearing cases under diversity jurisdiction should apply federal common law in
the absence of a relevant state statute.289
But there are also non-compulsory means to pursue uniformity. One method
is the design of Model Codes, which aim at state legislatures. Uniform
legislation is usually initiated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, a non-profit association that seeks "to promote uniformity
in the law among the several States on subjects as to which uniformity is
desirable and practicable. '290 One of the primary examples of a model code is
the Uniform Commercial Code, which is a joint project of the NCCUSL and the
American Law Institute.291 The main problem with this method is that it focuses
solely on state legislation. Courts in different states may interpret a similar
statutory provision differently, resulting once again in legal variance.292
Another method is the Restatement of the Law projects which primarily
address state courts. The aspiration underlying these projects is that state courts
will treat Restatements as authoritative, reaching uniformity on the judicial
level.293 The main problem is that Restatements generally set forth the law as it
286 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
287 See William W. Buzbee, Introduction to PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW,
AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 1, 2 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
288 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, NRA v. City of Chicago: Does the Second Amendment
Bind Frank Easterbrook?, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 997, 1010 (2010) ("[M]odern Commerce
Clause cases... trumpet comprehensive uniformity as the goal .... ").
289 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (referring to Cicero's call for
uniformity as the reason for developing federal common law of commerce).
290 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW, HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS 119TH YEAR, CONST. art 1, § 1.2 (2010),
available at http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Constitution; see also Larry
Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2134, 2134
(1991).
291 One of the main goals of the U.C.C. is "to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (2010).
292 See Grant, supra note 92, at 1086-87 (discussing this peril).
293 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 9 (1924) ("[The
Restatements] will be invested with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade.... I
have great faith in the power of such a restatement to unify our law."); Grant, supra note 92,
at 1088 ("The great purpose of the Restatements is to persuade courts to reconsider these
peculiar local rules ... in the interest of unity and certainty .. " (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Roscoe Pound, Unification of Law, 20 A.B.A. J. 695, 696 (1934)
("[Restatement projects are the basis upon which] [a]n economically unified
America.. . may well have a unified legal development under the leadership of nationally
minded jurists.").
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is. Current law is not always warranted, and across-the-board adherence to
Restatements may impede necessary modifications and developments. 294
I mention the main categories of unification projects in the U.S. for two
reasons. First, these projects emphasize the importance attributed to uniformity
in American legal thought. Second, they demonstrate that voluntary initiatives
suffer from inherent weaknesses as compared to forced uniformity through
federal lawmaking: model codes do not secure uniformity on the judicial level,
and Restatements are too static. Of course, the federal political structure of the
United States delimits federal lawmaking powers, thereby making the most
effective unification method unsuitable in many cases. Maritime law is one of
the special areas of law in which the overarching policy-to the extent that it is
justifiable--can be pursued through the most effective method. In fact,
according to prevailing views, this is a constitutional imperative.
One caveat needs mention at this point. Even a strict preemption doctrine
cannot guarantee absolute uniformity. First, relevant Supreme Court decisions
are occasionally susceptible to conflicting interpretations by the lower courts,
which undermine whatever uniformity obtained through preemption.295 Second,
most maritime cases are decided by the thirteen circuit courts of appeal and over
630 district courts that may interpret maritime law as they please in the absence
of a Supreme Court decision on the specific question at hand.296 Third, under
the "saving to suitors" clause many maritime cases are decided by state
courts.2 9 7 Although substantive rights and duties must be determined by
maritime law, procedure and to some extent remedies are governed by lexfori,
and this evidently undercuts uniformity. 298 A state court may also enhance
disparity by introducing its own interpretation of the relevant rule, in the
absence of a definite ruling of the Supreme Court on the subject.299
2. Uniformity as a Means
a. The Underlying Goals
The second and crucial step in my analysis lies in the understanding that
uniformity is not the ultimate end. It is a means for the protection of more
fundamental federal interests. The combination of the two assumptions, namely
that preemption serves uniformity and that uniformity serves external goals, will
inevitably lead to the conclusion that as the underlying justifications for
uniformity weaken, so does the need for preemption. What, then, are the
294 See Grant, supra note 92, at 1089.
295 See Peltz, supra note 103, at 104-05.
2961d. at 114-15.
297 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
298 Peltz, supra note 103, at 116-17.
299Cf id. at 115-16 (explaining that state courts have difficulty distinguishing land-
based from maritime concepts).
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justifications for uniformity? Are they reinforced or supplemented in the
maritime context?
In some contexts, uniformity may be associated with aesthetics. The
eighteenth-century philosopher Francis Hutcheson opined that "[t]he figures
which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty seem to be those in which there is
Uniformity amidst Variety. ' 300 Yet it is quite clear that in a commercial context,
maritime commerce in particular, "[n]o sense of theoretical beauty of similarity
prompts the courts to deny state law."301 Uniformity legitimately serves only
practical goals.
The first objective served by uniformity is legal simplicity. Complexity
might impose an undue burden on maritime commerce. 30 2 Ships, seafarers, and
cargo travel from one jurisdiction to another. In the absence of a uniform set of
rules, maritime actors must refer to the laws of any jurisdiction potentially
involved in planning their conduct. 30 3 If different laws apply at different points,
the cost of ascertaining in advance the law applicable to the activity as a whole
rises significantly. 30 4 Moreover, it is more difficult and more costly to comply
with legal standards that vary throughout the journey, especially but not only if
these standards concern relatively constant features of the particular activity,
such as ship design and construction, ship operating and safety, crew licensing,
cargo handling, and the like. Having to simultaneously obey numerous and
potentially incompatible local standards may impose "intolerable restrictions"
on maritime commerce. 30 5 In addition, the coexistence of various legal systems
with legitimate claims to applicability complicates and therefore raises the costs
of litigation and settlement.
The second objective served by uniformity is certainty, hence predictability.
As indicated above, ships, seafarers, and cargo constantly travel between
various jurisdictions. If the law applicable to a particular activity varies
throughout its duration, and fortuities-such as the exact location of a ship at
the time of the relevant incident--determine the law, the content of the law is
uncertain and legal risks are unpredictable. 30 6 In a contractual context, legal
3 0 0 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY
AND VIRTUE 17 (1726).
301 Currie, supra note 66, at 198.
3 0 2 See id.
3 03 See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924) ("The confusion
and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply with the local statutes at every port, are
not difficult to see."); Currie, supra note 66, at 160; Swanson, supra note 21, at 380
("[Courts endeavor] to avoid having a hodgepodge of laws apply to a vessel moving from
one state to another.").
304 See Swanson, supra note 21, at 413 ("Each vessel owner would be required to
consider a multiplicity of laws before making any decisions, adding to the cost of doing
business in the United States.").
305 See WC. Dawson, 264 U.S. at 228; see also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S.
443, 467 (1994) (citing WC. Dawson, 264 U.S. at 228).
306 See Stephan, supra note 285, at 746 ("In a world of multiple legal systems and
uncertainty about where things will go wrong, the parties must worry about divergent rules
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risks may be priced into the contract, and if they are unpredictable transaction
costs are necessarily higher. At a certain point people may even avoid otherwise
profitable transactions due to this indeterminacy. 30 7 If the applicable law is
unexpected, contractual allocation of risk may be jeopardized. In torts, certainty
about the legal risks enables potential injurers and victims to better prepare for
contingencies, either by modifying their conduct or through some sort of
insurance. 30 8 Finally, uniformity in a particular field prevents uncertainty
related to choice-of-law disputes, at least to the extent that the boundaries of the
field are certain.30 9
The third objective served by uniformity is fairness, namely treating similar
situations equally.310 Again, a typical maritime activity is not confined to a
single jurisdiction. In the absence of uniformity, the legal outcome of specific
conduct may turn on the fortuitous location of parties or objects at the time of
the legally relevant incident. This seems arbitrary. For instance, if a seaman was
injured due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel en route from New York to
Florida, the exact location of the ship at the time of the injury does not seem
like a reasonable determinant of the legal outcome. Similarly, if the same
incident occurred on two vessels transporting people or goods between ports A
and B, it seems unfair to apply different sets of rules to each incident just
because one occurred at port A and the other at port B.
Do these factors merit special consideration in the maritime context? The
answer must be in the affirmative. The advantages of a uniform legal regime are
more apparent and acute where the likelihood of cross-border activities is high.
Local activities do not normally generate competing claims to applicability. But
maritime activities, especially commercial ventures, are more often than not
interstate or international. So uniformity seems highly pertinent.
b. The International Dimension
As indicated in the introduction, the United States is a maritime nation, with
only two international land borders, and thousands of miles of coastline along
applying to their disputes."); Haeck, supra note 8, at 199-200, 206 ("[Uniformity aims] to
create a system where shipowners could predict the consequences of their actions.").307 See Stephan, supra note 285, at 746.
30 8 See Currie, supra note 66, at 160 ("[P]ersons would be enabled to plan their conduct
and their expenses simply and without the discomfort of necessary reference to the laws of
every jurisdiction that might be involved.... "); Haeck, supra note 8, at 199 ("The
uniformity of maritime tort law continues to be instrumental in ensuring that vessel operators
can predict the consequences of their conduct through adherence to uniform rules of
conduct ... ").309 See Currie, supra note 66, at 160.3 10 Cf Willem H. van Boom, European Tort Law: An Integrated or Compartmentalized
Approach?, in EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW BEYOND THE COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF REINHARD ZIMMERMANN 133, 134 (Antoni Vaquer ed., 2008) ("[T]he
proponents of harmonization of tort law [in Europe] argue that [this] would serve goals of
equal treatment of wrongs and rights and equal protection of, e.g., business interests .. ").
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two oceans. 311 Maritime ventures have always played a central role in
maintaining and enhancing national security and economic well-being. Recall
that in 2008 maritime transportation accounted for 78% of U.S. international
trade by volume and approximately 48% by value.312 American maritime law
must be responsive to the needs and expectations of U.S. trade partners, at least
to the extent that ignoring them may impinge on U.S. vital interests.
For starters, maritime activities that affect the American economy are
carried out in large part by foreign entities. So while uniformity of maritime law
is undoubtedly important for American maritime players, it is even more
important for foreign players. U.S. foreign trade partners need to encounter a
simple and certain legal regime when conducting their business in U.S. waters
or in cooperation with U.S. maritime actors.313 If U.S. maritime law lacks
uniformity, foreign players have to consider and adapt to a multiplicity of
potentially applicable laws. 314 This increases the cost of doing business with the
United States and may result in higher prices for American consumers, lower
profits for American producers, and other business disruptions. 315 In extreme
cases, foreign players may choose to avoid the United States altogether. 316
Simply put, variance within U.S. maritime law may discourage international
commerce and collaboration. Given the importance of international maritime
activities to the U.S. economy, the detrimental effect is evident.
Moreover, the global nature of maritime activities has motivated the
evolution of transnational maritime law from days of yore. The Roman
statesman Cicero observed that in his day maritime law was not the law of a
single country but rather transnational: "Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis,
alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una
eademque lex obtenebit.''317 The origins of modem maritime law date back to
the Laws of O16ron, a comprehensive set of rules promulgated in the twelfth
century by Eleanor of Acquitaine or (less likely) her son, King Richard 1.318 The
rules covered hiring of ships, delivering cargo, selling and hypothecating ships
and cargo, contributions in general average, liability for collisions between
ships, duties of pilots, and other topics. 319 Soon after their enactment they
311 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
312 See supra note 8.
313 See Haeck, supra note 8, at 181, 199 ("[F]oreign commerce interests need to be able
to act with a degree of certainty when shipping goods to and from the United States.").
3 14 See Swanson, supra note 21, at 413.
3 15 See id. at 380-81 ("Without a unifying national system, each state could have
adopted different maritime rules, causing an adverse effect on both internal and external
commerce.").
3 16 See id. at 413.
3 17 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (citing Cicero with respect to the
law of negotiable instruments) ("There is not a law of Rome, another of Athens, another now
and another later, but among the nations, at all times, there is one law.").
3 18 See Charles S. Haight, Babel Afloat: Some Reflections on Uniformity in Maritime
Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 189, 191-94 (1997); Paulsen, supra note 68, at 1070.
3 19 See Haight, supra note 318, at 191.
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became the benchmark for maritime regulations in all of Northern Europe,320
including the maritime laws of England.321 So historically, general maritime
law was one of the three main branches of the law of nations, a "body of rules
and customs developed and refined by a variety of nations" over hundreds of
years. 322 In American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,323 Justice Marshall
admitted that "[a] case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the
Constitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old as navigation
itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied
by our Courts to the cases as they arise. 324
The underlying rationale for this development is still evident, as illustrated
by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canadian National Railway Co. v.
Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. 325 In his well-crafted dissent, Justice La Forest
endeavored to justify the rule of no recovery for purely economic loss. In a
concluding comment, he noted that
[t]his case is one of maritime law, which in large measure encompasses a
global system. The bright line exclusionary rule against recovery has for nearly
a century been in effect in that system, and continues to be followed by the
major trading nations, in particular Great Britain and the United States.326
Those engaged in maritime commerce must, in his opinion, "be governed
by a uniform rule, so that they can plan their affairs ahead of time, whether by
contract or insurance against possible contingencies." 327 In other words,
uniformity on the international level facilitates international maritime activities,
for the same reasons that uniformity on the interstate level facilitates interstate
activities. U.S. trade partners legitimately expect some uniformity on the
transnational level.
In addition to uniformity on the judicial level, maritime nations have
endeavored to advance uniformity through international conventions. For
instance, in the early twentieth century the Comit6 Maritime International was
responsible for initiatives for international unification of the law concerning
320 See Paulsen, supra note 68, at 1070-72.
3 2 1 See JAMES REDDIE, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE LAW OF MARITIME COMMERCE
417-19 (Edinburg & London, William Blackwood & Sons 1841).
322 Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 1245, 1279-81 (1996).
32326 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
324Id. at 545-46.
325 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021, para. 332 (Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting).
326Id
327 Id.
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salvage, collisions at sea, and limitation of shipowners' liability.328 The United
States assumed a significant role in international negotiations of this sort.
3 2 9
The United States is by and large committed to international uniformity of
maritime law for practical and political reasons. From a practical perspective,
international uniformity may facilitate maritime activities in the same manner as
national uniformity but with greater vigor, due to the significant contribution of
foreigners to maritime ventures in America, unequalled in land-based
activities. 330 Thus, promoting uniformity is beneficial to the U.S. economy.
International uniformity can also save the costs of choice-of-law disputes where
citizens of different countries are involved. 331 From a political perspective, the
United States may pay a price in the diplomatic arena if it opts out of
international schemes, excluding itself from the family of nations. The Supreme
Court observed in American Dredging Co. v. Miller3 32 that -[a]t the time of the
framing, it was essential that our prospective foreign trading partners know that
the United States would uphold its treaties, respect the general maritime law,
and refrain from erecting barriers to commerce." 333 Comity with other nations is
still important today. Similarly, because many foreigners participate in maritime
activities under U.S. jurisdiction, adherence to an international-seemingly
unbiased-scheme may prevent tensions where entities from two or more
countries are involved in a particular incident.334
Now U.S. law cannot be consistent with uniform transnational standards if
it is internally varied. Domestic uniformity is a precondition for international
uniformity.335 In the words of Justice Hughes: "For maritime law the modem
relevancy of the single national voice in international affairs is that, when
America adheres to a law that is uniform among several nations, that law must
necessarily be uniform within this country." 336 This simple syllogism adds to
the other justifications for uniformity.
3 2 8 See Lord Justice Kennedy, The Unification of Law, 10 J. Soc'Y COMP. LEGIS. 212,
217 (1910).
329 See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 83, at 56-57 (discussing the role of the Maritime Law
Association of the United States).3 30 See Currie, supra note 66, at 163-64.
331 See Paulsen, supra note 68, at 1066.
332510 U.S. 443 (1994).
333 Id. at 466.
334 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 531,
533 (1833) ("[T]his class of cases has... an intimate relation to the rights and duties of
foreigners .... It may materially affect our intercourse with foreign states .... [A]dmiralty
jurisdiction naturally connects itself. . . with our diplomatic relations and duties to foreign
nations ... ").335 See, e.g., Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168 (1977) ("A state law in this
area ... would frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international
standards .... ").
336 Hughes, supra note 6, at 5.
2011]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
B. The Main Argument
1. The Capacity to Pre-Select Applicable Law
a. Prologue
Many attempts have been made to identify a uniform theme to maritime
preemption cases or to propose such a theme. 337 I noted above that a renowned
scholar found that "the Court's opinions [on maritime preemption from Jensen
to Yamaha] do not give intelligible reasons, just conclusions," and that even if
we attempted to discern useful patterns by viewing the aggregate results, "this
body of jurisprudence discloses few useful patterns."338 But I also showed that
several distinctions have emerged from the case law that may be quite telling in
a case-by-case preemption analysis. This section puts forward and defends a
new guidepost that is both theoretically sound and doctrinally tenable.
I contend that an inverse relation should exist between the preemptive force
of federal maritime law in a particular type of case and litigants' capacity to
pre-select the law applicable to their situation. Simply put, if the parties could
easily select applicable law before the occurrence of the legally relevant
incident, preemption of state law should be avoided, whereas if pre-selection
was unfeasible or too costly, preemption might be justified. Although this
argument needs to be defended and qualified before being implemented, two
fictional examples may be helpful at this stage. Consider first a breach of a
maritime contract for the carriage of goods from one state to another. According
to my thesis, federal maritime law should not preempt relevant state law,
because the parties could easily incorporate a choice-of-law provision into their
contract. Now consider a collision between two ships in U.S. territorial waters.
In this case, the parties could not negotiate a choice-of-law provision, because
they did not have any interaction prior to the accident. So preemption of state
law may be appropriate.
b. Theoretical Defense
The theoretical defense of my thesis has two components. The first rests on
the understanding, developed in the preceding section, that preemption is
intended to serve uniformity and that uniformity is not an end in itself, but a
means. Presumably, as the risks associated with lack of uniformity diminish,
uniformity may be tempered. Let us recall why uniformity is generally
warranted. First, it provides simplicity.339 Without it, maritime actors must refer
337 See, e.g., Robertson, Displacement of State Law, supra note 66, at 357-68 (proposing
a preemption model).
338 Robertson, Applicability of State Law, supra note 66, at 90; see also id. at 95-96
(showing that any attempt to synthesize this body of jurisprudence is untenable).339 See supra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
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to the laws of any jurisdiction potentially involved. Ascertaining and complying
with legal rules becomes more difficult and costly if applicable law varies. In
addition, the coexistence of various legal systems with legitimate claims to
applicability raises the costs of litigation and settlement. Second, uniformity
provides certainty. 340 In its absence, fortuities may determine the content of
applicable law, making preparation for contingencies more burdensome and
costly ex ante, and triggering choice-of-law disputes ex post. Third, uniformity
generates fair outcomes, because the legal outcome of a specific conduct does
not hinge on the fortuitous location of parties or objects at the time of the
legally relevant incident.34 1 Equal events are treated equally.
If the parties can pre-select applicable law, the above goals can be achieved
without uniformity, hence, without preemption of state law. If the parties indeed
pre-select applicable law only a single legal system remains relevant, so there is
no difficulty in mapping relevant law in advance and no particular complexity
in compliance. This simplicity persists after the occurrence of legally relevant
incidents, keeping the costs of litigation and settlement similar to those incurred
under a strict preemption regime. Moreover, a choice-of-law provision removes
any fortuity in the determination of applicable law and any related uncertainty
before and after the occurrence of legally relevant incidents. Of course,
uncertainties associated with the internal substance of the applicable law
remain. But pre-selection might ultimately generate more certainty than a strict
preemption doctrine, because commercial entities will presumably opt for the
least uncertain system of law, whereas the law governing an interaction under a
strict preemption doctrine cannot always claim this title. Finally, to the extent
that the determinative law has been pre-selected by the parties themselves, no
claim of unfairness can arise. In a particular case, the legal outcome does not
hinge on the chance location of parties or objects at the time of the legally
relevant incident. The parties' preliminary consent trumps any possible
complaint about the disparities between the legal outcomes of two similar
cases. 342 On top of that, assuming that maritime players will generally prefer the
same systems, owing to their internal certainty and simplicity,343 the outcomes
of similar cases will probably be similar anyway.
The second component of my defense lies in the inherent advantages of
private choice of law. Under a strict preemption regime, a single system
governs the subject matter. While uniformity has its benefits, it also has a
relative deficiency: it curtails regulatory competition. In the absence of a
340 See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
341 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
342See Horacio Spector, A Contractarian Approach to Unconscionability, 81 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 95, 99 (2006) ("[E]xcept under special conditions, informed and free consent
cleanses transactional unfairness.").
343 Similarly, competition among states for the most desirable corporate code has led
most publicly-traded corporations in the United States to incorporate under Delaware law.
See Department of State: Division of Corporations, STATE OF DEL. (JAN. 19, 2011,
8:17 AM), http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml.
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unification mechanism, and if private selection of applicable law is permitted,
various legal systems can compete over the terms offered to commercial
actors.344 Every state can offer a different regulatory scheme, and businesses
can choose the system that is most suitable for their needs and preferences via
choice-of-law agreements. As in any other market, free competition improves
the products, as long as there are no market failures. In the legal context,
competition can be expected to generate simpler, fairer, more certain, and more
efficient sets of rules, and thereby facilitate human action and interaction. States
have an incentive to endorse and devise better rules, because those that fall
behind may lose various sources of economic gain. People may move their
businesses to friendlier legal environments. Also, insofar as choice of law is
linked to jurisdiction clauses, offering better laws may encourage more legal
and related financial activities within the state. American legal history
demonstrates the importance of this type of competition. For instance, in the
United States the law of the state of incorporation, a voluntary contractual
choice, applies to most issues of corporate governance. Thus, the states have
competed over the terms of corporate governance. Not surprisingly, "corporate
managers decide where to incorporate largely on the basis of which
jurisdiction's laws are most likely to maximize the firm's value." 345
Apart from the gradual refinement of the law through competition, non-
preemption allows small-scale legal experiments. While it is possible to
speculate on the consequences of legal change, often with a high degree of
accuracy, the real consequences become evident only in retrospect. Assume that
a particular legal change is contemplated. In a uniform system, the change will
immediately affect the entire nation, for better or for Worse. In the absence of
uniformity-driven preemption, state systems may serve as test labs for legal
reform.346 If the experiment proves successful, other states can adapt to the
findings. If the experiment fails, the harm is experienced in a specific
jurisdiction, not across the nation.
c. Doctrinal Defense
So far, I have contended that pre-selection of applicable law by the parties
is generally preferable to uniformity achieved through preemption of state law.
The inevitable conclusion is that if the parties could easily select applicable law
before the occurrence of the legally relevant incident, preemption of state law
should be avoided, and vice versa. Now we need to determine whether this
guidepost is doctrinally tenable. To do so, we have to answer two questions.
First, is pre-selection legally possible? Second, can the capacity to pre-select
3 4 4 See Stephan, supra note 285, at 788; van Boom, supra note 310, at 135.
345 Stephan, supra note 285, at 791.
346 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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applicable law be taken into account in a preemption analysis within the
constitutional framework?
The doctrinal feasibility of my thesis requires legal validation of choice-of-
law provisions. American courts have long recognized contracting parties'
power to select the law applicable to their transaction.347 This principle is
manifested in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws348 and various
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code349 and has been followed by most
state courts. 350 This view was also implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in
MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 351 In that case, a towing contract provided
that any dispute arising from its performance would be adjudicated in
England.352 The Court held that forum-selection clauses "are prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
'unreasonable' under the circumstances. '353 The importance of this decision for
our purposes derives from the fact that the choice-of-forum provision was
upheld even though "English courts would enforce the clauses of the towage
contract purporting to exculpate [the towing company] from liability for
damages to the [towed barge]. '354 Put differently, the choice-of-forum
provision also implied a choice of law, and the two were given effect
together.355
347 See, e.g., William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice
in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697, 711-15 (2001) (discussing the history of
the American position on this matter); Richard J. Bauerfeld, Note, Effectiveness of Choice-
of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1659, 1659-60 (1982) (explaining that courts follow choice-of-law
clauses); cf D. St. L. Kelly, International Contracts and Party Autonomy, 19 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 701, 701 (1970) (explaining that choice-of-law provisions are generally recognized in
England).
348 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 (1971). The Restatement itself
does not directly apply to federal-state conflicts. Id. § 2 cmt. c.349 U.C.C. §§ 1-301(c), 4A-507(b), 5-116(a), 8-110(d) (2010).350 See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1260 n.96 (1997).
351407 U.S. 1 (1972).
352 Id. at2.
353 1d. at lO;see also id. at 12, 15.
3541d. at 15.
355 See id.; see also Bominflot, Inc. v. The M/V Henrich S, 465 F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir.
2006) (enforcing a contractual choice-of-law clause in a maritime context); Hawkspere
Shipping Co. v. Intamex, S.A., 330 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); Chan v. Soc'y
Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1296-98 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Stoot v. Fluor Drilling
Servs., Inc., 851 F.2d 1514, 1517 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); Zepsa Indus., Inc. v. Kimble, No.
3:08cv4-RJC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94602, at *5-7 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 11, 2008) (same). But
cf Jason R. Harris, Opting Out of Admiralty Law?: Uniformity vs. Freedom of Contract in
the Selection of State Choice of Law, 34 TUL. MAR. L.J. 167, 168, 170, 173 (2009)
(contending that choice-of-law clauses should not be enforceable to the exclusion of
applicable maritime law, because uniformity in maritime law must be maintained).
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While pre-selection of applicable law is usually explicit, the court can
deduce from the provisions of the contract that the parties wished the law of a
particular state to apply even in the absence of an express reference. 356 Still, the
power to pre-select applicable law is not unlimited. In the United States, it is
subject to at least two constraints. First, like any other contractual provision,
choice-of-law provisions are not enforced if one of the parties' consent was
obtained by mistake or by improper means, such as fraud, misrepresentation, or
duress.357 Second, the selected law will not be applied if its application
frustrates a fundamental policy of the state whose law would apply in the
absence of the choice-of-law provision (the default).358 The courts should not
refrain from applying selected law merely because it yields a different result
from the default; the difference must frustrate a policy that is so substantial that
it can "justify overriding the concerns for certainty and predictability underlying
modem commercial law."359 For example, a choice-of-law provision may not
be given effect if it circumvents relevant rules designed to protect weaker
parties in cases of unbalanced bargaining power, or rules that render the
contract illegal.360 These qualifications will be further discussed below.
Lastly, we need to determine whether conceding uniformity where pre-
selection is possible conforms to the constitutional framework. Admittedly, the
purpose of the Admiralty Clause was to maintain uniformity of maritime law
within the United States. 361 But this does not mean that courts will strike down
choice-of-law provisions in maritime contexts for jeopardizing uniformity. We
now know that uniformity is not an end in itself, so the Framers could not have
intended to promote uniformity for its own sake. They probably had practical
concerns in mind. As explained above, the underlying goals can be achieved
without uniformity where the parties can pre-select applicable law. Limiting
state power through preemption in the absence of a compelling federal interest
in doing so could not have been intended by the Framers. Implementing my
thesis entails, therefore, a refined interpretation of the Admiralty Clause. But no
radical step is required. After all, even Jensen and its progeny do not dictate
absolute uniformity, but "proper harmony and uniformity" in light of the
underlying goals. 362
356 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 cmt. a (1971).
3 5 7 See id. § 187 cmt. b.
358 See id. § 187(2)(b) & cmt. g; U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2010); see also Kelly, supra note
347, at 701 (showing that the power to select applicable law is also subject to public policy
under English law).
359 Woodward, supra note 347, at 735 (discussing the Reporter's notes to U.C.C. § 1-
301(f)).
3 6 0 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g.
361 See supra note 284.
362 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917); see also supra Part II.B.2.
[Vol. 72:4
DIFFERENTIAL PREEMPTION
2. The Contract-Tort Divide
a. A Judicial Heuristic
Academic literature seems to recognize an important distinction between
contracts and torts in unification and harmonization projects, including
uniformity-driven preemption. Yet the conventional view is that uniformity is
more vital in the realm of contracts. The late Professor David Currie, a
distinguished expert in constitutional law and conflict of laws, opined more than
fifty years ago that it is "of the utmost importance that the contractual rights of
persons engaged in maritime commerce be safeguarded from unwarranted
impairment by the diverse laws of the states." 363 Put differently, "[t]he
advantages of a uniform law are particularly great in contract, since contracts
are the core of planning for the conduct of business." 364 In his view, tort
liability is a relatively small concern for maritime businesses, due to its rarity,
so "uniformity is less important in tort than in contract. '365 Interestingly, a
similar justification for a distinction between contracts and torts is found in
recent literature on harmonization efforts in the European Union. According to
one author, "harmonization efforts concerning contract law have made more
sense than those concerning tort law."366 While variance of contract law may be
an obstacle to commerce within the EU, tort law plays a relatively minor role in
the decision making of businesses and consumers, so the differences in tort law
are unlikely "[to] distort any economic level playing field. '3 67 The relative
unimportance of tort law derives, in his opinion, from the fact that "[w]e tend
not to commit torts every day, but we definitely do enter into contracts every
day."368
My thesis supports a distinction between contracts and torts in preemption
analysis, but it actually mandates the exact opposite result from that advocated
by Currie. At this stage, the explanation seems almost trivial. I contended that if
the parties could easily select applicable law before the occurrence of the
legally relevant incident, preemption of state law should be avoided, whereas if
pre-selection was unfeasible or too costly, preemption might be justified. In a
paradigmatic contractual setting, the parties can incorporate a choice-of-law
provision into the contract. There is simply no need for uniformity. In a
paradigmatic tort case, on the other hand, the parties may have been complete
363 Currie, supra note 66, at 189.
364Id. at 210.
36 5 1d. at 189. Although this is probably one of Currie's first publications, it is deemed
quite important. It was included in FEDERALISM: A NATION OF STATES-MAJOR HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATIONS (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987). The paragraph explaining why uniformity is
more important in contracts was cited in Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn
Boat: A Critical Guide (Part 11), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 562 n.307 (1997).
366van Boom, supra note 310, at 135.
367Id
36 8 1d. at 136.
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strangers prior to the accident. Private choice of law is less likely, and the need
for uniformity arises. So if my thesis is valid, the case for preemption should be
generally stronger with respect to maritime torts, not with respect to maritime
contracts. This conclusion can serve as a judicial heuristic in maritime
preemption analysis and possibly as a general guideline in all types of
unification projects around the world.
The contract-tort divide is based on the understanding that uniformity is not
equally important in the two fields. I contend that it is more vital in torts, where
the parties cannot pre-select applicable law. Additionally, the main justification
for the opposite view, namely the relative rarity of torts in maritime operations,
cannot stand. It is erroneous to deduce the relative significance of tort law from
a comparison of the frequency at which maritime actors commit torts and the
frequency at which they enter into contracts. The proper comparison is either
between the frequencies of being subject to tort duties and entering into contract
or between the frequencies of committing torts and breaching contracts. Tort
law is omnipresent. Maritime actors are subject to a myriad of tort law duties at
every moment and with regard to any act. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that
contractual obligations have a significantly stronger impact on maritime
ventures than tort law duties. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the
tendency to breach contracts is systematically and significantly different from
the tendency to commit torts.
b. Possible Qualifications
I argued that if my thesis is valid, the case for preemption in a tort setting
should be generally stronger than in a contractual setting. But this judicial
heuristic should be employed with caution in view of its theoretical foundations.
This section aims to identify the limits of the rough distinction between
contracts and torts in maritime preemption analysis. It first examines whether
preemption may be justified in contractual contexts in which pre-selection is
invalidated, then discusses the possibility of pre-selection in certain types of tort
settings, and finally outlines other possible justifications for avoiding
preemption in specific types of tort cases.
Arguably, the existence of a contract should not always rule out
preemption, because the parties' capacity to pre-select applicable law is not
unlimited. As indicated above, this power has two fundamental constraints.
First, choice-of-law provisions are not enforced if one of the parties' consent
was obtained by mistake or by improper means. 369 Second, the selected law
cannot be applied if its application frustrates a fundamental policy of the state
369 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971); cf M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) ("A contractual choice-of-forum
clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy
of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.").
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whose law would apply in the absence of the choice-of-law provision.370 In
principle, where pre-selection is impossible or impractical, uniformity is
required, and uniformity-oriented preemption is justified. But where courts do
not give effect to choice-of-law provisions in cases of violation of public policy,
it is inaccurate to say that pre-selection was impossible or impractical. It was
possible, but not done properly. My theoretical argument is that uniformity is
unnecessary where the parties could pre-select applicable law, not only where
the parties actually incorporated an enforceable choice-of-law provision into
their contract. Where the parties can easily avoid complexity, uncertainty, and
unfairness, we should not use the heaviest constitutional weaponry, namely
preemption of state power, to achieve the same goals. The rationale for non-
preemption is still valid if the parties in a particular case failed to pre-select
applicable law or selected improperly, because the legal framework for
negotiating choice-of-law provisions was well-established and drafting an
enforceable provision was possible. The parties are expected to negotiate
choice-of-law provisions properly, just as they are with regard to any other
term. They cannot complain about the foreseeable consequences of non-
compliance with universal principles of contract law.
A unique policy concern arises in the case of extremely unbalanced
bargaining power, where the stronger party can dictate the applicable law.
Enforcement of choice-of-law provisions in such cases may have an
unwarranted effect. Strong parties may systematically prefer the law that affords
the weakest protection for their counterparts' interests. Moreover, in an attempt
to attract large businesses, states may compete in creating friendlier and less
burdensome legal regimes for strong entities at the expense of weaker parties. 371
Should this affect preemption analysis? Courts can protect the interests of
vulnerable parties by not giving effect to choice-of-law provisions in clear cases
of power abuse. Of course, a court will not strike out a choice-of-law clause
merely because bargaining powers were unequal. It will examine whether the
specific clause is patently unfair.372 A choice-of-law clause can be deemed
unfair only if the selected law significantly jeopardizes fundamental interests of
vulnerable parties and if these parties did not have a real choice because they
could not give up the product or the service and could not obtain better
3 70 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) & cmt. g (1971);
U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2010).
371 See Stephan, supra note 285, at 795 ("Jurisdiction might compete for businesses not
by offering them legal rules that generally add value, but rather by tolerating arrangements
that generate negative externalities .... Predators will force those with whom they contract
to accept national legal regimes that contain malignant rules.").372 Cf Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1992) ("It bears
emphasis that forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to
judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness.").
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protection at a higher price.373 This leaves a lot of leeway for legitimate pre-
selection, making compelled uniformity redundant. Powerful business entities
have an incentive to pre-select applicable law even if the selected law is less
biased, because simplicity and certainty have a significant economic value.
Policy-based constraints on pre-selection will only prevent them from dictating
one-sided law. Judicial scrutiny of choice-of-law provisions might also curtail a
regulatory "race-to-the-bottom" among the several states.374
The interim conclusion is that the contract-tort divide in preemption
analysis does not have notable exceptions on the contract side. On the other
hand, there are various types of tort settings in which the parties' interaction
began before the accident and pre-selection of applicable law was not
impossible or impractical. These types of cases call for qualification of the
judicial heuristic. Under the theoretical analysis, uniformity-oriented
preemption is not warranted where pre-selection is feasible, irrespective of the
concrete formulation of the particular claim. For example, vessel owners and
cargo owners can pre-select the law applicable to torts occurring during the
voyage; cruise lines and passengers can pre-select the law applicable to injuries
occurring during the cruise; and so on.
Of course, the capacity to pre-select the law applicable to tort disputes is
limited in the same manner outlined above. For example, provisions in contracts
between vessel owners and passengers purporting to relieve the owners from or
limit their liability for negligent infliction of death or personal injury are void,
being contrary to public policy.375 Any provision purporting to weaken
passengers' right to trial by a competent court is also deemed unlawful. 376
Therefore, a choice-of-law provision that refers the parties to a legal system that
denies liability for negligent infliction of death or physical injury must be
invalid.
An interesting question arises with regard to unilateral pre-selection of law
in tort settings. I explained that in certain types of tort settings the parties'
interaction begins before the harmful event, and consensual pre-selection is
possible. But even in the absence of prior interaction, pre-selection of applicable
law is often possible, though not warranted. Assuming that in the absence of
preemption applicable law depends on location, a shipowner may set the ship's
route in accordance with the legal outcomes of various types of conduct or harm
at each and every point. The owner may, for example, decide not to travel
through the territorial waters of states with relatively expansive liability
regimes.377 In paradigmatic contractual settings, both parties' consent is
373 Cf Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 593-95 (upholding a forum-selection clause in a
standard form contract between a large shipping company and its passengers because no
fundamental interest was infringed and the passengers could reject the contract).
374 Political pressures exerted by consumers on lawmakers, and consumers' willingness
to pay more for better protection may also restrain a regulatory "race-to-the-bottom."
375 46 U.S.C. § 30509(a)(1)(A) (2006).
376 1d. § 30509(a)(1)(B).
377 See Swanson, supra note 21, at 410,415.
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required for an a priori choice of law, so competition between jurisdictions is
sensitive to the interests of both parties and may gradually generate simpler,
fairer, more certain, and more efficient sets of rules. On the other hand,
competition in the realm of torts, with the intent to accommodate the
preferences of unilateral law selectors, may gradually increase tolerance to
negative externalities.378 This should be avoided. However, while contractual
choice-of-law provisions are subject to judicial scrutiny, unilateral selection is
not. So a different means must be employed to prevent strategic selection that
runs counter to public policy. This can be done by making unilateral selection
ineffective, namely through forced uniformity. To conclude, the likelihood of
unilateral selection should not qualify the contract-tort divide in preemption
analysis.
A different qualification derives from the understanding that state law
should not be preempted where uniformity is unnecessary. While the possibility
of pre-selection of applicable law is a good example of such a case, it is not the
only manifestation. For instance, uniformity is generally intended to facilitate
and advance maritime commerce, so it is arguably less needed where upholding
state law does not disrupt maritime commerce, as in the case of local wrongful
death legislation applied to purely local incidents. 379 If we add states' strong
and recognized interest in protecting life and limb within their borders, the case
for preemption of state law concerning wrongful death during the performance
of a local activity weakens even more. 380
C. Implementation
1. Level ofAbstraction
The theoretical framework proposed above must be used on a relatively
general topic-based level. Preemption analysis cannot be performed on a case-
by-case basis because it is a legal rather than a factual inquiry. However, the
contract-tort distinction seems too general to be determinative. First, as we have
already seen, the theoretical argument does not support an unqualified
distinction between contractual and tort settings for the purpose of preemption
analysis. Fragmentation of tort law may conform to my thesis. Second, and
more importantly, the proposed guidepost is intended not to replace but to
supplement traditional guidelines and distinctions. It ought to be used in
conjunction with other relevant distinctions that do not overlap the contract-tort
divide. For example, if a matter is sufficiently local, uniformity-oriented
3 78 See Stephan, supra note 285, at 795; see also Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel,
"Facts Are Stubborn Things ": An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over
the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 55, 61-74 (1998) (discussing the "race-to-the-bottom" in the environmental context).
3 79 See Currie, supra note 66, at 188.
3 8 0 See id.
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preemption may be inappropriate 381 even if the parties could not pre-select
applicable law. Third, preemption analysis must be sensitive to federal policies
underlying specific maritime law rules, not only to the overarching need for
uniformity. Fourth, it is important to consider the purpose of the relevant state
law and discern the degree of its interference with uniformity in order to
properly balance federal and state interests. 382 Nonetheless, given the centrality
of the contract-tort divide in implementing the proposed guidepost, I will use it
to systematically illustrate the possible utilization of my thesis.
2. Contracts
Maritime contract law covers various types of contracts, such as charter
parties, bills of lading, salvage contracts, towage contracts, repair contracts,
marine insurance, and maritime employment contracts. 383 In a contractual
context, pre-selection of applicable law is generally feasible, 384 so uniformity is
not necessary and uniformity-oriented preemption is not justified. To explain
further the practical implications of this idea I will now discuss two Supreme
Court decisions in which the outcome clearly conforms to my thesis, and two
other cases in which the outcome seems inconsistent with the proposed
guidepost. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co. 385 involved a charter-party that
included a provision whereby any dispute between the owners and the
charterers would be referred to arbitration.386 Federal courts had previously
found agreements to arbitrate disputes valid but unenforceable by specific
performance. 387 On the other hand, under the Arbitration Law of New York an
agreement to settle a controversy by arbitration was valid and enforceable.388
The Supreme Court held that although the "saving to suitors" clause did not
encompass "attempted changes by the States in the substantive admiralty law,"
it included "all means other than proceedings in admiralty which may be
employed to enforce the right or to redress the injury involved."389 Therefore,
New York could empower its courts to compel specific performance of an
agreement for arbitration. 390 This outcome is reinforced by the new guidepost,
given the contractual setting. The owner and the charterer incorporate a choice-
of-law provision into the charter-party, which is already a very sophisticated
381 See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
382 See Currie, supra note 66, at 206.
3 8 3 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 107, 137-38, 196-98, 485, 536-38, 676, 725-
26, 846-47 (discussing various types of maritime contracts).
384 See, e.g., id. at 546 ("Many bills of lading stipulate.., applicable law."); Harris,
supra note 355, at 167 ("Maritime contracts... often contain a choice of law clause.").
385264 U.S. 109 (1924).
3861d. at 109.
387Id. at 120-23.
388Id. at 118-20.
3891d. at 123-24.
390 d. at 124.
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contract. Under those circumstances, there is no need for uniformity, and no
reason to preempt state law. If the parties in Red Cross Line wanted to disable
specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate, they could have simply
provided that federal maritime law would apply exclusively to their transaction.
In Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co.,391 the legal question
was whether a causal connection between breach of an insurance policy
warranty and the insured's loss was necessary to deny recovery under the
policy.392 Texas law required a causal link between the breach and the
damage, 393 whereas a pre-Erie Supreme Court decision applying "general
commercial law" barred recovery whenever the insured was in breach of
warranty. 394 The Court held that there was no rule of maritime law on breach of
warranty and that there was no reason to fashion one; thus, state law should
apply.395 While this decision may be construed as validating the gap theory,396
the more plausible explanation derives from the specific topic: "[The] history of
insurance regulation in the United States warns us against the judicial creation
of admiralty rules to govern marine policy terms and warranties ....
[Regulation of] insurance companies and contracts has been primarily a state
function .... ,,397 This outcome is also supported by the new guidepost. An
insurance contract may include a choice-of-law provision. As the Court in
Wilburn Boat noted, breach of warranty can be treated in various ways. Some
states have prohibited forfeiture of insurance policies "in the absence of an
insured's bad faith or fraud. ' 398 Other states thought this rule inadequately
protected insureds and enacted "statutes like that of Texas which 'go to the root
of the evil' and forbid forfeiture for an insured's breach of policy terms unless
the breach actually contributes to bring about the loss insured against. '399 The
legal consequences of breach can be priced, so the use of choice-of-law
provisions can offer potential insureds a menu of different levels of protection
at different prices. One court protested that "maritime actors [are] faced with the
laws of fifty jurisdictions when maritime insurance disputes arise," and that
insurers and insureds have an incentive "to 'shop around' for the most favorable
state insurance laws."400 But as explained above, the ability to select applicable
391 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
392Id. at 310.
393Id. at 312.
394. at 314-16.
395Id. at 314-16, 319-20.
39 6 See Burrell, supra note 83, at 66. For an analysis of the gap theory, see supra notes
192-204 and accompanying text.
397 Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 316. Insurance remains the only financial industry in the
United States not regulated on the federal level. See Ronen Perry, Insurance Regulation:
Lessons from a Small Economy, 63 SMU L. REv. 189, 190 (2010).
398 Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 320.
39 9 1d. (citing Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 253-54 (1906)).
4005801 Assocs., Ltd. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 662, 665 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993).
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law actually stimulates competition that can generate better law and facilitate
human action and interaction.
I now turn to cases in which the legal result does not seem to conform to my
thesis. In Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,401 the Court discussed an oral agreement
in which a shipowner promised a crewmember that if he accepted treatment at a
public hospital, the owner "would assume responsibility for all consequences of
improper.. . treatment. '40 2 Federal maritime law regards oral agreements as
valid,40 3 whereas the New York Statute of Frauds does not.40 4 The Court found
that the contract "may well have been made anywhere in the world," and was
not a matter of local concern, so general maritime law must apply.40 5
Seemingly, this decision does not conform to my normative argument: The
parties to an employment contract can pre-select applicable law, hence
uniformity is unnecessary and preemption is unjustified. Nonetheless, applying
my thesis does not necessarily yield a different outcome in this particular case.
The capacity to pre-select applicable law eliminates the need for uniformity, but
in the absence of an actual choice-of-law provision the court needs to determine
which law applies to the case in accordance with ordinary choice-of-law
principles. This is essentially what the Court did in Kossick. It opined that "the
process is surely rather one of accommodation, entirely familiar in many areas
of overlapping state and federal concern, or a process somewhat analogous to
the normal conflict of laws situation where two sovereignties assert divergent
interests in a transaction as to which both have some concern." 40 6 It then
explained that "several considerations point to an accommodation favoring the
application of maritime law."40 7 Even if the Court endorsed my view that
uniformity should not have been an issue, the other considerations might still
point in the same direction.
The earlier case of Union Fish Co. v. Erickson408 presented a similar
question. The master of a vessel sued the owner for breach of an oral
employment contract. 40 9 The California Statute of Frauds provided that an oral
agreement not performed within one year was invalidated.410 The Court decided
that California law was inapplicable.41 To be sure, the Court reiterated its
commitment to uniformity.412 But it based this conclusion on the fact that the
parties did not contemplate any services in California, but in Alaska, making
401 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
4021d. at 732.
40 3 Id. at 734.
404I. at 733.
405 Id. at 741-42.
406Id. at 739.
40 7 Kossick, 365 U.S. at 741.
408248 U.S. 308 (1919).
409M. at 311-12.
4101d. at 312.
411Id. at 314.
4 12 Id. at 313.
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California law irrelevant, and on the assumption that the parties intended
maritime law to apply.413 So, once again, even if uniformity were taken off the
table, as mandated by the new guidepost, the outcome would not necessarily
change. Ordinary choice-of-law principles would probably exclude California
law even without preemption, and although Alaskan law could have a strong
claim to applicability, the Court might find that the parties implicitly selected
federal maritime law.
3. Torts
Maritime tort law covers various types of harmful events, such as personal
injuries and death of seamen, longshoremen, passengers and visitors; collisions
and marine casualties; marine pollutions; and general average. 414 In a
paradigmatic tort setting, pre-selection of applicable law is generally
impractical, so uniformity is necessary and preemption is justified. For example,
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentir415 involved a helicopter crash on the way
from an offshore drilling platform to Louisiana.416 Decedents' dependents
brought wrongful death actions under the Death on the High Seas Act417 and the
Louisiana wrongful death statute.418 The Court held that the federal statute
preempted state wrongful death statutes. 419 This outcome is in line with my
thesis. Dependents' right to recover for the wrongful death of maritime workers
en route on the high seas cannot hinge on the fortuitous location of the accident.
Of course, pre-selection of applicable law is impractical because maritime
workers' relatives are not contractually related to potential wrongdoers.
Therefore, uniformity is required and preemption is justified. Where pre-
selection is impractical and no special reason to concede uniformity exists,
preemption of state law conforms to the new guidepost.420
4 13 1d.
4 14 See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 107, 121-23, 209-10, 320-22, 762-63
(discussing various categories of liability).
415477 U.S. 207 (1986).
4 16 1d. at 209.
41746 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006).
418 Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 209.
419I. at 227, 232-33.
420 See, e.g., In re Amtrak "Sunset Limited" Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (11 th
Cir. 1997) (discussing a collision between a towing vessel and a railroad bridge resulting in a
fatal train accident; holding that Alabama's wrongful death statute could not apply because it
conflicted with maritime law principles, e.g., by allowing punitive damages for mere
negligence); Md. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 1221, 1224, 1228 (4th Cir.
1995) (discussing injury to an oyster bar in Maryland waters caused when defendants' barge
went aground; holding that federal fault-based liability rule preempts state strict-liability
scheme); IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee SS, 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1993)
(discussing economic loss incurred by the plaintiff following a collision between the
defendant's ship and a third-party's dock during a maritime journey in Louisiana; holding
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A different outcome might be justified where pre-selection is possible. In
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,421 a seaman was injured at work and
instituted a negligence action against the shipowner under New York common
law.422 Under general maritime law, a vessel owner is liable for the
maintenance, cure and unearned wages of a seaman injured "in the service of
the ship," regardless of fault, 423 but at that time a seaman could not bring an
action against the owner for negligence. 424 The Court held that although
maritime law rights can be enforced through state common law remedies under
the "saving to suitors" clause, the rights and duties of the parties must be
assessed under federal maritime law.425 While Chelentis is a tort case, the
parties were contractually linked and could pre-select applicable law. Thus,
protecting vessel owners from additional liability through preemption of state
common law seems redundant.426
Of course, the capacity to pre-select applicable law is not the only relevant
consideration. In some types of cases pre-selection is impractical or impossible,
but uniformity may be conceded for some other reason. In Pope & Talbot Inc. v.
Hawn,427 "a carpenter employed by an independent contractor was injured
while working on a ship berthed on navigable waters in Pennsylvania." 428 The
shipowner contended that plaintiffs own negligence contributed to his
injuries.429 Under Pennsylvania law contributory negligence barred recovery,
whereas under general maritime law contributory negligence could only
mitigate damages. 430 The Court found state law inapplicable: "While states may
sometimes supplement federal maritime policies, a state may not deprive a
person of any substantial admiralty rights ..... '431 The parties were not
that Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925), whereby purely economic
losses are irrecoverable, preempts state law).
421 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
422Id. at 378-79.
423M. at 380-81; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 298-306.
42 4 Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 381; see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 210-11. Today,
the Jones Act establishes a cause of action for negligence against an employer for an injury
or death caused to a seaman in the course of employment. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006);
Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964).
425 Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384; see also Stevens, supra note 22, at 252.
426 Another case in which the parties could pre-select applicable law but state law was
preempted is Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 (1925). The Court held
that in deciding whether a maritime employer was negligent towards an employee, the jury
could not consider state safety regulations: "The rights and liabilities ... arose out of... the
general maritime law and could not be enlarged or impaired by the state statute." id. at 457.
On the other hand, in Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941), the parties could pre-select
applicable law, but the Court decided to apply the Florida survival statute to a maritime
cause of action. Id. at 386-87, 391.
427 346 U.S. 406 (1953).428 1d. at 406.
429 Id.
430 1d. at 408-09.
4 3 1ld. at 409-10 (footnote omitted).
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contractually linked, so pre-selection of the law applicable to their interaction
was impractical, though not impossible. However, the activity was purely local,
so subjecting the parties to Pennsylvania law could not significantly impair
simplicity, certainty or fairness, or affect international relations. Preemption
was unjustified because applying uniform rules to purely local activities was
unnecessary. In Hess v. United States,432 a carpenter employed by an
independent contractor was killed while taking part in the repairs of a dam in
Oregon navigable waters. 433 The Court held that an Oregon liability statute was
applicable. 434 From a theoretical perspective the case was equivalent to Pope &
Talbot because the parties could not pre-select applicable law and uniformity
was nonetheless unnecessary given the purely local nature of the event.435 The
outcome, therefore, seems justified.
Similarly, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.436 discussed the
interplay between federal and state law regarding marine oil pollution. A federal
statute imposed liability for oil spill cleanup costs incurred by the federal
government. 437 The Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act
imposed strict liability for any damage incurred following an oil spill in state
territorial waters. 438 The Court concluded that state law was not implicitly
preempted by the federal statute.439 To be sure, pre-selection of applicable law
was impossible, so uniformity was supposedly warranted under the proposed
guidepost. But preemption of state law was not justified for other reasons. At
the time, federal law did not provide a remedy for private losses consequent on
marine oil pollution. Without state remedies, private victims could not recover
at all. This was a very troubling lacuna that preemption would have sustained.
432361 U.S. 314 (1960).
4331Id.
4 34 Id. at 318-21.435
"Graham's death and the wrongful act or omission which allegedly caused it
occurred within the State of Oregon .... Id. at 318. Moreover, the activity in which the
decedent was involved was local. Another case in which the parties could not pre-select
applicable law, but uniformity was probably unnecessary due to the local nature of the
incident is Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). The Court applied
California wrongful death statute to a stevedore's death in California, emphasizing that
"[t]he subject is maritime and local in character ... " Id. at 242. An additional example is
Yamaha Motor Corp., US.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 213-16 (1996). A girl was killed
while riding a jet ski on vacation in Puerto Rican waters. Her parents sued the jet ski
manufacturer and sought to supplement remedies available under maritime law through
Pennsylvania law. Id. at 201-02. The Court found that the maritime judge-made cause of
action for wrongful death was not intended to be comprehensive, so it did not displace state
wrongful death statutes. Id. at 213-16. Again, pre-selection of applicable law was
impossible, but the situation was local and had nothing to do with maritime commerce. See
Burrell, supra note 83, at 75-76.
436411 U.S. 325 (1973).
4371. at 328.
4 38 1d. at 327.
439M. at 328, 336, 344.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Admiralty Clause and the Judiciary Act grant jurisdiction to the federal
courts with respect to maritime matters, but give state courts concurrent
jurisdiction. From these jurisdictional grants, and possibly other sources,
concurrent federal and state lawmaking powers derive. The coexistence of these
powers triggers preemption disputes. The exact boundaries of state maritime
lawmaking power have been the subject of extensive judicial and scholarly
debate, but remain somewhat obscure. The question of liability for economic
loss arising from marine oil pollution illustrates the confusion. This Article has
set forth and defended an original guidepost that can help determine whether
preemption is called for in various types of maritime cases, and has
demonstrated that this policy-driven guidepost can support a straightforward
judicial heuristic.
The structure of the main argument may be summarized as follows. The
purpose of the Admiralty Clause was to maintain uniformity of maritime law
within the United States. Recognition of federal lawmaking powers and
preemption of state law are seemingly required to achieve this constitutional
goal. However, uniformity is not the ultimate end. It is a means for the
protection of more fundamental federal interests. Because preemption serves
uniformity, and uniformity serves other goals, preemption can only be justified
to the extent that it fulfills the goals underlying the desire for uniformity. Thus,
an inverse relation should exist between the preemptive force of federal
maritime law in a particular type of case and litigants' capacity to pre-select the
law applicable to their situation. If the parties can pre-select applicable law, the
objectives usually associated with uniformity can be achieved without
compelled uniformity, hence without preemption of state law. An additional
justification for this principle rests on the concept of regulatory competition. In
the absence of a unification mechanism, and if private selection of applicable
law is permitted, various legal systems can compete over the terms offered to
commercial actors, thereby generating better law.
This Article has shown that the proposed guidepost supports a qualified
distinction between contract and tort cases in maritime preemption analysis, but
mandates the opposite result from that advocated by Currie and van Boom. In a
paradigmatic contractual setting, the parties can incorporate a choice-of-law
provision into their contract, so there is no need for uniformity. In a
paradigmatic tort case the parties may have been complete strangers prior to the
accident, so private choice of law is less likely and the need for uniformity
arises. If my thesis holds, the case for preemption in maritime tort law is
generally stronger than in maritime contract law. This can serve as a judicial
heuristic in maritime preemption analysis and possibly as a general guideline in
various types of unification projects, subject to a few qualifications.
The reader may correctly observe that the proposed theoretical framework
has a partly covert assumption, namely that state autonomy ought to be retained
by default. Put differently, state sovereignty should not be trumped in the
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absence of a very persuasive reason, and only to the extent that this reason is
valid. A comprehensive defense of this assumption transcends the scope of this
Article. Suffice it to say that it has underpinnings in American constitutional
law and political tradition, and strong policy-based justifications. 440 Of course,
one who believes that a high degree of centralization is politically warranted,
irrespective of the direct advantages of uniformity of private law, may find a
sophisticated delineation of the proper ambit of private law unification less
expedient.
Although the importance of this Article with respect to maritime
preemption analysis in the United States is evident, it may also be useful in
other contexts and in comparable political unions. As a prominent author once
observed, maritime preemption discourse may contribute "to the solving of
other of the constantly recurring and more inflammatory issues having to do
with the relations of the federal government and the several states. ' 441 For
example, the new guidepost may be used in general preemption analysis to
assess congressional intent in the absence of express preemption. Moreover, as
this Article offers a general theory of unification, it may assist scholars and
policymakers engaged in unification and harmonization projects in the United
States and other federal and transnational systems, like the European Union.442
The unification debate on both sides of the Atlantic has revolved mainly around
the proper content of uniform laws. So far, very few attempts have been made
to provide theoretical analyses of the merits and limits of unification per se.
This Article helps fill the troubling theoretical gap.
440 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."); Epstein, supra note 288, at 1010 (recognizing "a default provision against
the federal intervention in internal state activities in the absence of a clear statement to the
contrary in any federal law"); Nelson, supra note 130, at 229 ("[Cjonservative advocates of
federalism and liberal advocates of government regulation have joined in arguing that the
current tests for preemption risk displacing too much state law."); Verchick & Mendelson,
supra note 148, at 15-18 (discussing possible justifications for preserving state regulatory
authority); see also supra notes 115-18, 134-35, 344-46 and accompanying text (discussing
the role and importance of state regulation in the United States).
4 4 1 DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 5 (1970) (quoting Charles L.
Black, Jr., Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259, 261
(1950) (internal quotation marks omitted).
442 Considerable efforts to unify or at least harmonize private law in the European Union
have been underway in recent years. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES
OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCES (Christian von Bar et
al. eds., 2009); EUROPEAN GRP. ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT
AND COMMENTARY (2005); Helmut Koziol, Comparative Law-A Must in the European
Union: Demonstrated by Tort Law as an Example, 1 J. TORT L. 5, passim (2007).
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